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# Eternal?

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EVERT JANSEN WENDELL  
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1918





# Is the Life of Man Eternal?

"So when this corruption shall have put on incorruption and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O, Death where is thy sting. O, Grave where is thy victory."—*The Greatest of the Apostles.*

By **FRANKLIN BLADES, M.D.**

Rush Medical College

Formerly a Judge of the Circuit Court of Illinois



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*Affectionately inscribed*  
*to the friend of many years*  
**ISAAC NEWTON PHILLIPS**

*The accomplished lawyer*  
*and gentleman*  
*Lately and long the able and efficient*  
*Reporter of the Superior*  
*Court of Illinois*



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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

BY

GEORGE A. GATES, D.D., LL.D.

(President of Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn.)

The future life is not a matter to be treated mechanically or dogmatically. So supreme an act of faith as the belief that there is for us humans a conscious personal existence beyond physical death is to most thoughtful people, a reverent hope. To treat that hope in the spirit of controversy or stark argumentation seems blasphemous. To pour ridicule or contempt upon those who find themselves still doubtful of so great a possibility is wicked. "There lives more faith in honest doubt, believe me, than in half the creeds." But the word "honest" must have the chief emphasis, if the poet's word is to be held true.

There seem to be those to whom confidence in immortality is easy. It is not easy for some of the rest of us to understand that facility. But as great as is the reach of faith to attain and hold belief in the future life. the opinion that "death ends all" involves still greater

difficulties. Nature abounds, indeed, in what seem to be wastes, but not in such wastes as universal death would be. So much of the best in human life, and thought, and spirit, and high endeavor, would seem to bear the mark of ultimate failure, that one shrinks from the despair of final death as too illogical. So, put in the coldest intellectual manner possible, the larger faith holds its place.

To some the view of the writer of this essay that there is no other adequate support for belief that motive and conduct can be intrinsically right or wrong, than faith in the future life, will seem unsound. To others of us, Judge Blades' position seems correct. Ethics is practical or nothing. And practically, how foolishly, the word will largely be: "Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die." The sanction of eternal life is none too much for the support of the ethical appeal. Even in spite of that glorious call, sin holds high and persistent revel and works its awful dooms. How immeasurably worse would be our human case without the larger hope?

The easy criticism that this reduces ethics to sheer commercialism is not valid. Spiritual rewards are not cheap payments of "happiness" (one of the weakest words in the language) or "glory." In the realm of spirit, rewards are in kind. That is: the reward of virtue is more virtue; of character, higher character: good deeds, opportunity to do more of them.

"The wages of Sin is death; if the wages of Virtue be dust,  
Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm and  
the fly?

She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,  
To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky:  
Give her the wages of going on, and not to die."

But the Great Hope strikes its main root deeper than

## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

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the Stratum of ethics. It lays hold on the foundations of spirit. Moreover its mysteries present no greater difficulties than the daily wonders of the Universe involved in the modern conceptions of All that Is.

Our author has brought to his treatment of this great theme the reverent study of mature life and thought. It is worthy. It should be largely helpful.

GEORGE A. GATES.



## PREFATORY

The theme of immortality, old as humanity, is yet ever new—new as the generations come and go. The theme is perennial as man—the race. What with the Higher Criticism and the revelations of modern Science, venerable theological dogmas, and mere gross dogmatic materialism are being discredited, but the nobler faith and hope survive, and lift the spirit of man above the grosser things of time and sense.

While not much that is new can be advanced affirmatively in support of faith in the future life, in the attitude of scientific negationists, and the point of view from which they discuss the question, there is much that is new. So that to the extent that support of the doctrine of immortality consists in the refutation of these new positions of scientists, the arguments for immortality may be said to be new.

The higher ground and more strongly intrenched position of physiological materialism, which has to a large extent taken the place of other forms of materialism under various guise, has rendered less effective, indeed obsolete, the weapons of attack of vulgar dogmatic materialism.

If at present there is reason to believe that, in effect, Higher Criticism, and the doctrine of evolution are contributing not only to loss of faith in what is purported to be Divine Revelation, but to subversion of faith in the immortality of the soul, there are, on the other hand,

those who believe that the lost ground will be more than recovered by the new, and advanced, and more reasonable position being taken in eliminating antiquated dogmas and superstitions which not only are not essential to New Testament religion, but have been its clog and curse ever since the apostolic time; and that aside from the reinforcement which may be brought to the faith of Christian believers in immortality, something is to be gained by taking up the challenge of the predominant modern school of materialists that mind is purely a chemico-physiological function, and refuting them on their own ground.

When the writer set out to crystalize his thoughts upon this subject he felt so confident that the moral sense—the moral attribute of the mind—is a postulate upon which might be predicated what could be most forcibly said in support of faith in immortality, that it was a disappointment to find that generally ethical writers seemed to regard the subject as if the main, if not the only concern of the moral life, is with matters of secular interest, and as if the relation of the moral sense to the future life, was an incident of secondary importance. However, it may with much force be contended, that the science of morals, if it may be termed a science, performs an important office in the secular field of utility, since whether mortal or immortal man must “live and move and have his being” within the conditions of this life. But most thoughtful men must at times be overwhelmed with the feeling that they may as well have never lived at all (better, indeed, though living man can hardly be reconciled to the thought), if this world contains all of his existence. On reading much of the literature which the physical scientists and men of note in philosophy have written on the theme of immortality in

recent years, the writer is impressed that too little consideration has been given to this aspect of the question.

So far as a considerable body of thinking, doubting, people are concerned, the questions of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are not to be met and argued, or dogmatically settled, by an appeal to the Old and New Testament scriptures. The physical scientists have undoubtedly exploded the Mosaic, probably ante-Mosaic, myth of the creation of the world and of man, and of the moon and stars which were regarded as the attendants of the earth; and with many not profoundly reflecting people, this seems to have shaken the whole foundation of possible revelation. These doubters are too much inclined to believe—perhaps rather, fear—that science has had the last and conclusive word against the duality of man.

In every age since the Christian epoch, Christianity has been the chief champion of the doctrine of immortality. In the Law as inscribed on the Tables of Stone, and in all the Pentateuch there is no hint of a life beyond the grave. Whatever of faith there exists in the future life in the nominally Christian lands, even outside of the Christian Church, and even among those who reject Christianity, is mainly due to Christ and His disciples. But the faith of the Christian peoples has been and is based on what is claimed to be Revelation. But now Christianity seems to have reached a pause. At any rate, after the lapse of nearly two thousand years, not a moiety of the adult population of the lands nominally Christian, are professedly Christian. The long ages of teaching that God is ever present and ever interfering in the affairs of man have produced that general state of mind which cannot at once receive the new departure without a shock to faith in the essentials of the Christian



system. In the moral catastrophe which may follow, and which some contend has already occurred to a considerable extent, there are some grounds to fear that faith in immortality may be, indeed is, greatly subverted.

There are wise Christian apologists who do not despair. They see that the Higher Criticism does not affect the fundamentals of the Christian system, and that the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution is consistent with belief that God is immanent by universal knowledge and power, in all nature, and that he creates and rules by universal cosmic law; that God was the designing genesis of the evolutionary process in organic life which has attained its highest reach and finality in man; and that while evolution has ceased as a physical and psychical factor in man—that man is the “finished product,” as John Fiske puts it—volitional development of his moral and intellectual nature has gone on, and will go on indefinitely.

On this ground the doctrine of the future life is unsailable by physical science. For while it may be true, as John Fiske has said, that the “spiritualistic hypothesis may, perhaps, be still regarded as on trial,” when it comes to the moral and intellectual life of man the negation scientist can speak with no greater authority than the common sceptic.

To the extent that evolution, in one form or other, either Darwinian or mutative, comes generally to be accepted as the cause of man’s physical being, the conflict between science and religion will probably cease if the scientists shall generally become content exclusively with their own field of observation and experiment. Aside from purported Revelation, which it is not here proposed to enlist in this contention as Revelation, the grounds for and against belief in immortality are for the

most part metaphysical, and so science can claim no advantage in argument. The axioms and methods of physical science cannot be enlisted on the side of negation for they are inept in considering intellectual and moral problems. The predominant thought sought to be expressed and enforced in this essay is that the moral sense in man is the highest and best evidence of the existence of soul personality and life beyond the grave.



# Is the Life of Man Eternal?

## I

### ANTIQUITY OF BELIEF IN A FUTURE LIFE

In that admirable little book "Through Nature to God," John Fiske writes: "The belief in the personal continuance of the individual human soul after death is a very ancient one. The savage custom of burying utensils and trinkets for the use of the deceased enables us to trace back to the glacial period. We may safely say that for much more than a hundred thousand years mankind have regarded themselves as personally interested in two worlds, the physical world which daily greets our waking senses, and another world, comparatively dim and vaguely outlined with which the psychical side of humanity is more closely connected"—albeit earliest traditions show that their religion was a fetichism, or animism, as it is among the lowest tribes to-day, and the realm of spirits a region wherein dwelt demons personated in the destructive forces of nature, and peopled with the ghosts of those who had lived on earth.

A remarkable, though of itself insignificant as an initiative event in the moral evolution of man was the emerging of Abraham out of the ploytheism and idolatry of his native Semitic tribes, and his vigorous faith in one invisible God. It is hardly too much to say that his departure out of the land of his kindred and repudiation

of idolatry, are the beginnings of one of the most remarkable racial, and the greatest moral movements of the world. No other event has been so momentous, far reaching and prolonged as a moral constructive force in the upbuilding of civilization. But withal it is to be said, that there is no evidence that Abraham had any notion of a future life. His idea of Jehovah, and that of the Hebrew people on being led through the wilderness, and in their national life in Canaan, was that of a temporal ruler. In all the highly penal and bloody code of the Books of the Law, so harshly and cruelly in contrast with the mild and benevolent system of morals given to the world by Christ, there is nothing indicating belief in rewards and punishments in a future life. And it is especially to be noted that in the only part of the code given to Israel in which it is said that it was "written with the finger of God," *i. e.*, on the Tables of Stone, the only penalties denounced against disobedience are secular and temporal. This omission may well be explained by the fact that the scheme of Moses was political—a scheme of temporal government for the Hebrew people as a nation. It was not the founding of a church having a spiritual relation to a future life. In the first book of Samuel it is recorded that when the elders demanded of Samuel, the prophet and judge, that he "make" them a king, Jehovah said to Samuel "they have not rejected thee, but have rejected me, that I should not be King over them." Their national organization was political, with Jehovah as their invisible King, as they believed. As late as the time of Christ when the Jewish people were held in subjection to Rome, even his Jewish disciples "hoped that it was he who should have redeemed Israel."

It is true that in the later history of the Jewish people the sect of the Pharisees arose who believed in

the resurrection of the dead. Josephus is quoted in the Standard Bible Dictionary—the Pharisees—as saying that they were the Jewish equivalent of one of the leading schools of Greek Philosophy. But the Saducees, the aristocracy to which the high priests and their families and the Judges and officials belonged, and who rejected the oral law, and held that only the written law as given by Moses was obligatory, did not believe in the resurrection.

Though the Jewish people were without faith in a future life, they believed that a righteous Jehovah was their temporal ruler and that they were subject to his sanctions either approbatory or penal in national and individual life, according as their conduct was good or evil. This faith imparted a general high moral tone for the greater part of their independent national existence, to their literature; and supplemented as this came to be by the Christian idea of the universal brotherhood of man, and the immortality of the morally fit, it may be taken as the greatest, and perhaps final and still progressive moral evolution by which the entire race will in the long run of the ages to come, attain the high level of the Golden Rule.

Coming on down the stream of time we find the greatest philosophers of Greece teaching the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Socrates had ideas of God and immortality much as have been entertained by Christian peoples, though not without a vestige of the pagan notion of other gods, for in the last hour of his life he requested his friend Crito to offer a cock to Aesculapius.

Many centuries later, out of the dead level of Jewish corruption, and exclusiveness, and even idolatry, and the bestiality and atheism of the world-absorbing Roman

Empire, like a world-wide moral searchlight, "Towering o'er the wrecks of time," rose Jesus of Nazareth, purporting to come from God, whose devotion to humanity was attested on the Cross, who said: "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth on me though he die, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth on me shall never die." In every age since the Christian epoch, multitudes of his disciples, in every condition of life, have derived consolation and hope from this assurance.

## II

## AGE OF SCEPTICISM—CAUSES OF WANING FAITH

Whatever the cause, or rather combination of causes, having their root in physical science in its conflicts with theological dogmas and in economic and social conditions, the wide consensus of the well informed is that there is a momentous drift away from belief in God as an actual Being, and from the hope and consolations to be found in faith in a future life.

The late Professor LeConte, of the University of California, in his book on "Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thoughts," said: "There can be no doubt that there is at present a strong and to many an overwhelming tendency towards materialism. The amazing achievements of modern science; the absorption of intellectual energy in the investigation of external nature and the laws of matter have created a current in that direction so strong that of those who feel its influence—of those who do not stay at home shut up in their creeds, but walk abroad in the light of modern thought—it sweeps away and bears on its bosom all but the strongest and most reflecting minds."

Rev. George Adam Smith in his "Lectures on the Lyman Beecher Foundation" in Yale University in 1901,



said: "In the first place, we can scarcely find today any parish or congregation of educated people, in which are not some almost as devoid of hope for the future as the most despairing Psalmist in the Psalter. In the thinking of civilized men there have been for years a steady ebb from the shores of another life."

The testimony of the late President Harper, of the University of Chicago to the same effect, is important and highly significant. In a communication to the *Sunday Inter-ocean* of May 17, 1903, among other matters of importance, he said:

"This is the age of scepticism. The university training tends to make the student doubt the lessons which he blindly received in his childhood. Before he will again believe them true he must solve them in his own mind. If he has been rightly grounded in the fundamental principles, the fire of doubt will only transmute him into firmer belief. If he has not been properly prepared his ideals will fall, probably never to rise again."

"As far as the outward show of religion is concerned there is every indication that infidelity has increased in our Universities. The religion of the educated man is becoming less based on theological dogmas, more based on demonstrable truths, more determined to find expression in better social conditions and larger social sympathies." However, the distinguished President expressed himself as not being without hope for the future, for he thought he saw an increasing tendency to practice the distinguishing virtues of Christianity.

In what Dean Hodges, of the Episcopal Theology School at Cambridge, Mass., has to say in the ("Magazine") *Outlook* for August, 1906, of the "Religious Life in American Colleges," there is a startling statement of

the indifference to religion which prevails in Harvard University. Prior to June, 1886, attendance at prayers had been required. After that date attendance was made voluntary. "The immediate result was to empty the chapel, and the pews have never since been filled." Of the 2,000 students in the academic courses and the five hundred teachers, only about 150 daily attend at chapel. At Sunday evening services the attendance is somewhat larger. "The Voluntary system brings out those who care." What is the cause of this indifference? Is it cultivation of the "head" at the expense of the "heart"—these symbols of the intellectual and moral in man's mental constitution? Is it because the study of "modern psychological science dispenses altogether with the soul"? and that the "new psychologists have ceased to think nobly of the soul, and even speak of it as a complete superfluity," as the distinguished Professor Osler recently said at Harvard.

Thus writes Goldwin Smith, in the *North American Review* for May, 1904: "However, it would seem that we have come practically to a point at which Evolution and the Higher Criticism having between them done the work of demolition, and the work of reconstruction being still in the future, no small part of educated mankind has renounced or is gradually renouncing the hope of a future life and acting on the belief that death ends all."

A large majority of those who are identified with the various religious sects, know little or nothing about the Higher Criticism. They regard it as going to the root of Christian faith, and the discrediting of the so-called Mosaic books, so long believed to have been composed by Divine Inspiration, as sapping the foundation of the whole Christian system. It is not uncommon to hear

people of even more than average intelligence asserting, that if they are to give up the Mosaic account of Creation as mere legend derived from the ancient east, they can have no faith in anything purporting to be of Divine authenticity. They know little or nothing of the archaeological and historical reasons upon which the Higher Criticism is based and which reverent scholarship holds not to be inconsistent with sound Christian faith. And as to the doctrine of evolution, there are but few comparatively who understand it and believe it. To the great body of the common people it seems to remove God entirely out of the scheme of Creation.

But there is a larger body of mankind who do not appear to be much concerned about a future life and upon whom Christianity, as represented by the various sectarian divisions, has but little influence as to their faith in another existence beyond the grave. This class of people are chiefly influenced by material and social conditions. Their want of faith in, or at any rate seeming indifference to, the future life, does not rest in an intelligent conviction that there is no basis in science or natural reason for such belief. It is not easy to perceive and clearly define their mental attitude. Perhaps it may be attributed to mere want of serious reflection on the subject. It is difficult for anyone in ordinary health to have a lively realization that any hour of the day one may die; and so there largely prevails an unreflecting inclination to make the most of things material which immediately affect domestic life and the relations of the individual and family to society.

One of the strong influences tending to bring about this result—or, at any rate which prevents the counteracting of the increasing tendency—is the secular and Christless spirit so largely prevailing in the sectarian churches

—the wide disparity between profession and practice—between precept and example. As a general rule it is not easy to distinguish between the common run of the membership in their behavior in political and business affairs, and in social life, from well behaved people out of the churches. And in the large commercial and monetary centers where wealth is such a controlling factor, the social arrogance and clannishness of wealthy members in their relations with others not of their "set" even in the churches, and the chilling atmosphere of the meeting-houses where the highly respectable rich assemble to "plume their feathers," and to introspectively contemplate their happy condition and superior virtues, and from which the stranger and the ill-clad poor are excluded by the stong stare of the usher, have been greatly influential in driving large masses of people, especially the wage earning classes, into indifference and scepticism. These people, who in one way or other, are driven away from the churches, find recourse in secret and mutual aid organizations which rival the churches in fraternal spirit and in their benevolences. A labor-union convention is reported to have passed a resolution in which it is declared in substance, that the labor organizations have done more for the benefit and improvement of the laboring people than all the churches.

The distinguished President of Harvard University not long ago in an article on "The Voluntary Church in a Democracy" made this statement, among other matters of much interest: "Obviously there is a good co-operative purpose in membership in an insurance arcanum, or in a grange, or in a temperance lodge; whereas Church membership has in the past been too often represented as a measure taken to secure personal participation in future advantages accessible only to a

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select few." No doubt there are saintly souls everywhere who are animated by the spirit of New Testament Christianity but this does not break the force of the general indictment.

## III

## DECLINE OF RELIGION AND CONSEQUENT MORAL DISASTER

No greater moral misfortune could happen to a people than to have their faith shaken in the religious dogmas and traditions of many generations without a sufficient period of probation to allow a sifting out of the mythical and superstitious and a settling down upon a faith which appeals to the highest and best in the spiritual nature of man—the simple and sufficient faith expressed on the Mount that the pure in heart shall see God in the future life.

This finds illustration in what has occurred and is occurring in certain Latin countries. In general it may be said that in the South American States, in the lives of the common people, Christianity seems to have lost its spiritual meaning and reforming influence. The ceremonials and ritual of the church have lost their symbolic and spiritual meaning. Christianity consists not in daily living, but in the observance of the mechanical and spectacular. It may be said without intending irreverence, that the brutal and bloody bull-fight seems to be next in attraction to the mass, is the chief diversion of the Lord's Day.

In Italy, especially in Rome, right within the shadow of St. Peter's and the Vatican, the anti-clerical feeling is hostile and violent. No stronger testimony can be

given of the feeling hostile to the Church than the election of a Jew to the chief magistracy of the Capital of the Catholic world. This spirit prevails in various parts of Italy. What is the cause of this spirit of hostility is not entirely clear. It may be due somewhat to the course of the Vatican towards the Crown and Italian unity. But whatever the cause the alienation appears to be radical and final. The anti-Church tendency is also extending in France. In both Italy and France the reaction does not appear to be towards Protestantism, but towards atheism. The people of these countries have for so many generations been taught that there is no other religion than the Catholic religion that to break with that means no religion at all.

Dr. Draper in his "Intellectual Development of Europe" has well said: "Nations plunged into the abyss of irreligion must necessarily be nations of anarchy"—moral anarchy certainly, and probably ultimate political anarchy. The anarchist of today is an atheist.

The moral cohesion and progressive development of human society has ever been associated with religion and belief in a Being or beings superior to man; as for instance the fabled gods of the pagans, or the Jehovah of the Hebrews, and of the Christian era, by whom sanctions were imposed either in this life or in the world to come, and moral restraints have become relaxed and moral degeneration has followed the loss of such faith. It is hardly too much to say that as a general rule the want of such faith tends to relax the moral fiber and lower the practice of moral living. There may be outward conformity to the conventional or common standards of morality even without the consciousness of being held in restraint by the general sentiment; but on crucial occasions, when confronted with the opportunity of de-

giving great personal advantage which will not bear the test of intrinsic morality, but with no loss of credit in society, it is not the many who will safely pass the ordeal. There cannot be that rooted and grounded fear of inward moral taint, that recoiling from the thought of stain of soul, which more surely influences the conduct of those who believe in immortality and the divine source of the moral law. All history reinforces the belief that the vast body of mankind, even of the countries thought to be most enlightened and morally elevated, must be held in restraint by sanctions of some sort or other. The most elevated Christian peoples believe in sanctions, and are more or less influenced by such belief. It is true that individuals are to be found so practiced in virtue, so refined and elevated in character that they never on any occasion seriously entertain the thought of wrong doing.

"Evil in the mind of God or man  
May come and go so unapproved, and leave  
No spot or blame behind."

Logically there can be no escape from the conclusion that if there is to be no life beyond bodily death, there can be no act or intent intrinsically moral or immoral. And the certainty that society political and social, civilization, could not exist in the total universal condition that there is no such moral state as intrinsically essential morality—that no act or intent, is intrinsically wicked; and the fact that all civilized society worthy the name rests upon the bottom of universal conviction of the essential nature of right and wrong, logically forces the conclusion that this moral sense is natural and inherent in man's mental constitution—as much so as the power to think at all. That motive and conduct



to be of essential value must be subject to a tribunal possessing the infallible intelligence to perceive the secret intent, and the universal power to enforce sanctions, if motive and conduct are to be considered of more than ephemeral, uncertain and conventional value, logically forces the conviction that such tribunal must exist in another life or not at all. If not, the result would be the same as if the sense of the intrinsic essential nature of right and wrong did not exist at all.

The Apostle Paul recognized this logical necessity, for he said in First Corinthians, "If the dead are not raised let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die." What compensation to man can there be in the "few days and full of trouble," for the eternal night of the grave?; as he lies in the ground, decaying down to dust, of what greater consequence is he than the horse or dog? Really, it would seem that to the man of serious thought, if convinced that this earth contains for him all of conscious existence, it would rather be better not to have lived at all. Miss Sophie Witte quotes Tolstoy, in the *Independent*, as writing to his aunt Tatyana, "I saw my brother's death. Nothing can be worse than death, and if we consider death as the inevitable end of every living being, we must admit that there is nothing worse than life." Cicero, in his "Paradoxes" said, "Death is dreadful to the man whose all is extinguished with his life, but not to him whose glory never can die." No doubt the consciousness which some men have that they will be famous throughout all historic time, compensates in large measure for the doubts they may entertain of a future state of existence.

On first blush it is probable that not many would assent that if there is to be no life after bodily death, there can be nothing intrinsically morally right or wrong.

Most people would say, thinking only of the present state of civilization, "Right is right in any event." Yes! as a matter of expediency. It is no doubt true that in an economical and social sense "Honesty is the best policy." People succeed better in business affairs in the long run, and are better respected in the society in which they move, if it is found that they can be trusted.

But the field in which organized society can take cognizance of the transactions of men either to enforce rectitude in the performance of agreements, or in the protection of persons and property, is comparatively limited. And on account of the fallibility or perverseness of human testimony, and the fallibility of human tribunals the failure of justice in courts of law, is not uncommon. No crime is so immune as murder. In no case can human tribunals get at the heart of man. In no case can motive, the real intent, be ascertained except inferentially and mistakes are frequently made. In ordinary social relations people often grossly misjudge each other. Motive is the controlling factor morally in the serious affairs of life. This is so generally received as true, that in the investigation of crime, when it is found impossible to find a rational motive for an act deemed criminal, it is usually attributed to aberrancy in some form or other. It is true that motive is sometimes so complex that no man can always feel sure as to the predominant motive that controls his own conduct.

It is a common experience that there are many offenses against the moral law of which courts of law cannot take cognizance, and for which there is no legal redress—conduct which the common consensus condemns as in violation of the fundamental rules of common honesty which prevails in Christian lands. In such cases, if the man is certain that he is not amenable to

proceedings in courts of law, and has no belief that he will be accountable in another life for "deeds done in the body," what motive can he have for what he does but that which he decides for himself will best promote his individual interest, either socially or in business affairs. He has no standard of moral doing which he recognizes as valid, aside from that which is temporal and human, and variable as the customs and conditions of human society. How can it be otherwise?

Recognizing the moral deterioration consequent upon loss of faith in the future life, Goldwin Smith in a communication to the New York *Sun* among other interesting things said: "Since the subversion of religious belief, morality is dragging its anchor."

The *Literary Digest* of Feb. 2, 1907, makes some selections from recent editorials appearing in the *Wall Street Journal* concerning the moral effect in business of the want of belief in a future state of existence. Coming as they do from one conducting an important financial and commercial journal at the center of the greatest financial transactions of the continent, what he writes is well worth noting. Asserting that there is such a decline of faith, Mr. Pratt, the editor, observes that it "alters the basic conditions of civilization," "becomes a factor in the market," "changes the standard and affects the value of things that are bought and sold," "there is no one who would not prefer to do business with a person who really believes in a future life."

"The question, therefore, of practical, immediate, and tremendous importance to Wall Street quite as much as any other part of the world, is, has there been a decline in faith in the future life? and if so, to what extent is this responsible for the special phenomena of our time—the eager pursuit of sudden wealth, the

shameless luxury and display, the gross and corrupting extravagance, 'the misuse of swollen fortunes,' the indifference to law, the growth of graft, the abuses of great corporate power, the social unrest, the spread of demagoguery, the advance of socialism, the appeals to bitter class hatred? To find out what connection exists between a decadence in religious faith and the social unrest of our time, due, on one side, to oppressive use of financial power, and, on the other, to class agitation, might well be worth an investigation by a commission of government experts, if it were possible for the Government to enter into such an undertaking."

An ever memorable example of the bad effect of loss of faith in the one true and living God, and of a want of faith in a future state of existence, is afforded in the career of Solomon, King of Israel. In the beginning of his reign, with devout reverence for Jehovah, and the erection of the magnificent temple devoted to His worship, he ended his life a despairing pessimist, in brutal lust and idolatry: "Now King Solomon loved many foreign women, together with Pharaoh's daughter. . . . Solomon clave unto these in love. And he had several hundred wives, princesses, and three hundred concubines; and his wives turned away his heart. For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart after other gods. . . . And Solomon did that which was evil in the sight of Jehovah." He built altars to heathen gods upon which his foreign wives "burnt incense and sacrificed unto their gods."—(1 Kings, 11)

It is conceivable, no doubt probable, that one born and bred in the atmosphere and influences of a civilization due to Christianity, but yet does not believe in God and immortality, may have a high sense of what is

morally right, and lead a life of rectitude; but inevitably he would have less power of resistance and weaker motive to resist wrong doing, under stress of the strong temptation which comes to most, if not all people, in the midst of even the best moral surroundings, than one of equal natural moral fiber who believes that conduct and motive will momentously influence his destiny in another life. And it is quite certain that there is a large body of people of even the most enlightened nations, who, not believing in a future state of existence, are held in restraint only by law or public opinion. No man can possibly be made better by such want of belief. The inevitable result would be—justified by memorable epochs in the history of the race—that society would be made worse were such belief to come generally to prevail. It is hardly too much to say that the man who advocates it, however correct his motives and upright his life may be, is in effect the enemy of his kind.

## IV

## WHAT NEGATIONISTS WOULD GIVE US

Now what has the negationist to offer as a substitute for this loss of faith and the lowering of the high ideals of the moral life?

Here is the picture which the philosopher of Jena, in his "Riddle of the Universe," with brutal candor draws for our delectation:

"Our own human nature, which exalted itself into an image of God in its anthropistic illusions sinks to the level of a placental mammal, which has no more value for the universe at large than the ant, the fly of a summer's day, the microscopic infusorium, or the smallest bacillus. Humanity is but a transitory phase of the evolution of eternal substance, a particular phenomenal form of matter and energy, the true proportions of which we soon perceive when we set it out on the background of infinite space and eternal time.

. . . The best we can desire after a courageous life, spent in doing good according to our light, is the eternal peace of the grave." But there can be no peace in oblivion. There is no peace in the oblivion of sleep. The peace comes on waking to a feeling of rest and refreshment, of the restoration of exhausted energies. What is Haeckel's peace but the peace of the chemical constituents of the human body, which death and de-

can resolve into the elementary forms which pervade earth and air?

Nor do we see a helping hand held out to us by the agnostic school of philosophers and scientists, high in the ranks of whom stand Huxley and Spencer. In all his vast projects of synthesizing and unifying philosophy, Mr. Spencer ignores the problem of the future life. In the realm of the psychic he treats only of phenomena. What lies behind phenomena he holds to be unknowable. While in set terms disavowing materialism, what he has to say about the source of the moral sense and its final practical perfection in the life of the race, is inconsistent with the idea that it is an attribute of soul personality. He treats it as a physico-moral evolution consummating as a physiological function: "So do I believe" ("Data of Ethics") "that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility"; and so, "In their proper times and places and proportions" (whatever that may mean) "the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations." This may properly be termed physiological morality.

And thus Huxley: "For the assumed substantial entity, spirit, which is supposed to underlie the phenomena of consciousness, as matter underlies those of a physical nature, leaves not even a geometrical ghost when these phenomena are abstracted. And even if we suppose the existence of such an entity apart from

qualities, that is to say, a bare existence for mind, how does anybody know that it differs from that other entity apart from qualities, which is the supposed substratum of matter?" . . . . "And if I try to think of the 'spirit' which a man by this hypothesis, carries about under his hat, as something devoid of relation to space, and as something indivisible, even in thought, while it is, at the same time, supposed to be in that place and to be possessed of half a dozen different faculties, I confess I get quite lost." The assertion of Huxley that when the "phenomena of consciousness" are abstracted there is not left "even a geometrical ghost," is without point and force when it is considered that there is never a moment of time in normal waking human experience when the "phenomena of consciousness" are not present.

There seems to be no agnosticism in the philosophy or science of Haeckel. He writes with as much confidence of soul personality and immortality as any familiar fact in the field of biology. He treats soul entity as a fallacy once for all to be as briefly disposed of as any other fallacy exploded by natural science. Thus in his "Riddle": "The extreme importance of the subject leads us to oppose to these untenable 'proofs of immortality,' a brief exposition of the sound scientific arguments against it." And this is one of his "sound scientific arguments against it": "If then the substance of the soul were really gaseous, it should be possible to liquefy it by the application of a high pressure at a low temperature. We could then catch the soul as it 'breathed out' at the moment of death, condense it, and exhibit it in a bottle as 'Immortal fluid' (*fluid animae immortal.*) By a further lowering of temperature and increase of pressure it might be possible to solidify it—to produce



'soul snow'. The experiment has not yet succeeded." On reading this one may well say with Sir Oliver Lodge, in "Life and Matter," that philosophers "have found by experience that men of science who have once transcended the boundary" (between philosophy and science) "are apt to lose all sense of reasonable constraint, and to disport themselves as if they had at length escaped into a region free from scientific trammels—a region where confident assertions might be freely made, where speculative hypothesis might rank as theory" (might well say rank as science) "and where verification was both unnecessary and impossible."

It is said that it is in the interest of truth that these negationists either deny the existence of soul personality, or ignoring that question altogether, speak of the moral sense as having no bearing on the subject of the future life. Truth! What is truth? Nearly two thousand years ago the Roman procurator, before whom Christ was arraigned, propounded this query which has gravely concerned the honest thinker in every age. Doubting, and awed in the presence of the man whose marvelous personal majesty and mysterious power, was to move all future generations of men and uplift the race, Pilate said, "What is truth?" On another occasion Christ had said, "I am the way, the truth, the Life"; "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." How free? The truth that frees the soul from the propensions of the things that are "of the earth, earthy"—the truth that takes away the sting of death, that defeats the victory of the grave. The "truth" of spiritual nihilism means slavery to things material and perishing, degrading dread of annihilation.

## V

## SOUL PERSONALITY

It is, of course, of first importance to be able to arrive at the reasonable assurance that man possesses a spiritual entity in order that a reasonable hope may be entertained of immortality. No one, not even the most earnest believer in God and immortality, claims that we can know that God exists, and that we have souls which may, if morally fit, become immortal, as we know things that are open to the observation of the senses. No one knows how we think, nor what it is that thinks. In a sense not vague nor ambiguous, one may have metaphysical knowledge. One can know nothing in the extensive field of philosophy as things can be taken cognizance of in physical science. In the sense that Huxley must be understood to disclaim knowledge of the soul, nothing can be known of many matters concerning which the philosopher may and does have metaphysical knowledge, and entertains no doubt. The consideration of causes which lie behind proximate causes come within the sphere of philosophy. The professional psychologist is so confident of the accuracy of his knowledge concerning mental phenomena, that psychology is termed a science; yet much of the subject lies in the region of the speculative and metaphysical.

Dr. Maudsley in his "Physiology of Mind" does not treat Psychology with much respect as a true science. Thus he writes: "He who would realize how vague,

uncertain, speculative, how far from the position of a true science, psychology is, should endeavor to grasp some one of its so-called principles, and to apply it deductively in order to predicate something of the character of a particular person; let him do that, and he cannot fail to perceive how much he has been mocked with the semblance of knowledge, and must needs agree with Bacon as to the necessity of a 'scientific and accurate dissection of minds and characters and the secret dispositions of particular men!'"

Huxley, though an avowed agnostic, ventures into the field of speculation thus; "It is quite true, that, to the best of my judgment, the argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good for men; and therefore, that all states of consciousness in us, as in them, are immediately caused by the molecular changes of the brain substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism." This distinctly attributes mental phenomena to physical causation or it means nothing. Perhaps it would be better to say that he holds that mental phenomena find their root in physiological action.

Mr. Spencer concedes that there is "something" which lies behind "mental activities" of which these "activities" are symbolical. Thus: "Mind as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of activities and the cohesion of these activities, one with another throughout the aggregate compels the postulation of a something of which they are the activities." That is to say, if understood correctly, compels the conclusion that there is "something" which is manifested by "activities"—a "something" existing prior to the "activities," which causes the "activities." As the author

holds that matter "is but the symbol of some form of Power absolutely and forever unknown to us"—a symbol of that which "we cannot suppose to be like the reality"—so mind also is unknowable and is "but a symbol of something that cannot be rendered into thought." As to what this "postulate" is he professes to know nothing, except perhaps in a negative sense, i. e., that it is not something which a "man carries about under his hat"—is not "something" which exists in the absence of consciousness, and "possessed of half a dozen faculties." That which makes us conscious of ideas is an "unknown permanent *nexus* which is never itself a state of consciousness but which holds states of consciousness together"; that is to say, a permanent unknown "something" which possesses no element of consciousness yet goes to make up consciousness—is the cause of consciousness.

Professor James of Harvard, in a footnote in the first volume of his *Psychology*, quoting a passage from Mr. Spencer which seems to be an attempt to explain the origin of consciousness, makes this comment: "It is true that in the *Forthnightly Review* (vol. XIV, p. 716) Mr. Spencer denies that he means by this passage to tell us anything about the origin of consciousness at all. It resembles, however, too many other places in his psychology (e.g., secs. 43, 110, 244) not to be taken as a serious attempt to explain how consciousness may at a certain point be 'evolved'; that when a critic calls his attention to the inanity of his words, Mr. Spencer should say that he never meant anything particular by them, is simply an example of the scandalous vagueness with which this sort of 'Chromo Philosophy' is carried on."

## VI

FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF SOUL PERSONALITY—PHYSIO-  
LOGICAL AND OTHER FORMS OF MATERIALISM

Professor Ladd of Yale University, in his "Outlines of Physiological Psychology" says that "Some writers have gone so far as to advocate 'psychology without a soul'"; and while he substantially concedes the field to the "new psychologists," he does not go so far as that. "For a long time," he says, "the so-called 'old psychology,' as pursued by the introspective and metaphysical method, made little or no advance. In a single generation, as pursued by the experimental and physiological method, the science of psychology has been largely reconstructed."

But does this necessarily exclude all consideration of mind or soul as the *reality* behind mental phenomena? Indeed the Professor reserves to himself the right at the close of the more strictly scientific discussion of the book to verify certain conclusions as to the nature of the human mind, and as to its general connection with the bodily organism. Some of the considerations introduced at this point are of the kind ordinarily known as "metaphysical," for he holds that "psychology, even when it employs the physiological method, has the right and is under obligation, to suggest and defend true conclusions as to the nature of mind."

Professor Wundt, the greatest of the German psychologists, in speaking of the sum of the achievements and creations of the human mind ("Human and Animal Psychology") says: "What is the ultimate goal of all this mighty current of mental development? Experience cannot answer; while the ideal completion of experience, which philosophy tries to discover, can have no other foundation than the development given in experience. It is here that psychology finds a place; it is one of the first witnesses called upon by philosophy for information which shall aid in her ideal construction." Furthermore: . . . "the hypothesis that mental development might somewhere come to an end, to be replaced by simply nothing, would, of course, imply a recognition of the invalidity of any ideal completion. More than that, the whole of the mental content of the universe would cease to have any significance. For what meaning could we read into mental life in general other than that of a great and lamentable illusion, the growing store of man's mental possessions confirming him more and more strongly in his justifiable expectation of further development, while the end of all things should still be nothingness."

Why limit psychology to the study of the mere mechanism of the temporal and spacial relations of man's mentality? "Science discovers, describes, registers the facts; philosophy interprets them." "We next need to know what they mean, and what the cause is that underlies the cosmic processes." "What is the nature of the causality, and is it moving towards any goal? (Bowne's "Personalism") Why separate the facts from the philosophy of the facts? How profitless to limit the study to the discovery of the temporal and spacial relations of mental processes, and their description in dry, pro-

fessional and difficult terminology, and there leave them. If the philosophical interpretation of the facts leads to the metaphysical conclusion that they mean sensualism, or materialism, or agnosticism, or pantheism, or atheism, or that a soul personality lies behind and is the moving cause of mental phenomena, why so be it. The best reason, that which best satisfies man's mentality, that which the history of the race best demonstrates to be the true source of the progress and moral uplift of the race, must ultimately prevail.

Though it may be hardly admissable to indulge in the temerity of calling in question the exclusively experimental, or mechanical method of the "new psychology," one can hardly refrain from considering its moral effect, and its influence upon faith in the future life. The moral sense and its phenomena manifestations, belong to the emotional side of mentality, and it is that attribute in the high development which we see in the good man, which transcendantly elevates him above the brutality of the man who "fears not God, nor regards man," and out of which spring the hope and faith of immortality. No one was ever induced by cold reason alone to perform moral obligation as a sense of duty. He may perform moral obligations mechanically and as a matter of utility—for the one reason certainly that he finds "honesty to be the best policy." But there is no virtue, no morality in it. "If man is sociable and moral it is less because he thinks than because he feels in a certain manner and tends in a certain direction." (Ribbot.)

However unassailable the position of the "new psychology" may be in its scientific attitude, from the point of view of the moralist, the empirical or mechanical method leaves in the mind a sense of incompleteness,

not to say futility. It is so liable to be regarded as all there is in the subject worth while (and indeed is so taken by very many) that the thought naturally occurs that this method may be influential in producing the scepticism which is said to largely prevail in some of the higher institutions of learning. Phenomena so remarkable in manifestation, and so momentous in effect in the intellectual and moral life of the individual and of society, would seem to demand that the *cause* which lies behind it all would have place in every consideration of the subject.

In the rage—if that word may be used in respectful sense—the phrase noble rage has familiar place in literature) of a large section of physical scientists to account for everything psychical, including the highest cognitive powers of man, as the phenomenal manifestation of natural or material forces, claiming as many do, that the “whole cognizable world is constituted, and has been developed in accordance with one common fundamental law,” they discard everything that cannot be brought within the definitions and methods of physical science. The conditions and indications of the beginning, growth, and death of individual man in his physical characteristics, are so exactly like that the lower animals from which it is held he is “descended,” that the devout believer is at times overwhelmed with apprehension that after all, his destiny may be the same. So salient and so predominant are these physical characteristics in controlling the lives of the vast majority of the race, and so obscure and unknowable are the sources of the cognitive powers and their relation to the physical organism, through which alone they are made manifest, that many of the most eminent in science find it impossible to believe but that the physical is all there is of man.



Perhaps it is true to say that the "new psychology" is chiefly the outgrowth of the new physiology which made a rapid and revolutionary advance on the discovery that the cell is the biological unit of all organisms vegetable and animal, and that the germ-cell as formed by the fertilization of the human ovum of the female by the spermatozoon of the male and their fusion into a new and common cell, is the genesis of every human being—that it is by and through this germ-cell that the organic and psychic life is perpetuated from generation to generation. All organic growth is by cell development and in fact the animal body is a body of cells. But the most remarkable and significant discovery—as seems to be generally agreed by biologists—is that there are certain microscopical bodies in the nuclei of the fertilized germ-cell which are the bearers of the heredity of the physical and psychical characteristics of the two ancestral lines.

The discovery of the localization in various parts of the brain of the centers of sense perception is a significant contribution to the science of physiological psychology. Haeckel goes further and contends that the centers of the "higher psychic faculties—the associations of impressions, the formation of ideas and concepts, inductive and deductive" in the brain have been definitely traced, if he is understood correctly. And here is a parting of the ways between the physiologico-psychological materialists who hold that method comprises the whole of the problem, and the physiological psychologists who hold that the study of method is a study of the mechanism by and through which there is a revelation of the soul reality which lies behind it all.

The external organs of sense, auditory, visual, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, differ in mechanical function.

If the eye in some sense photographs objects, and by its operation images are transmitted to the brain, this cannot be said of the other organs of sense. While the range of observation by the other organs of sense, other than the eye, is not nearly so great as by the eye, the impressions received by the brain are quite as distinct. In either case, the immediate effects are mechanical. The initial effect, and the transmission to the proper sensorial center, are mechanical. These movements contain no element of the psychic. Cognition does not take place until the sensorial center is reached. The action of light on the retina is no more cognitive than the action of light upon the sensitive paper of the photographer. There must be something possessing intellectual attributes capable, not only of perceiving and retaining the mental impression of the object perceived, but possessing the capacity to think about it, of considering its properties and intimate constitution, and of recollecting not only the object but what has been rationalized about it. Then when, and where, and how, does cognition take place? Is it in the sensorial centers where transformations occur from physical energy—say in the form of motion—to consciousness or thought—a something possessing no property of matter—a mere ideal state—a metaphysical abstraction—a state of abstraction in which it is impossible to discover the quantitative equivalent of the mechanical energy which has disappeared. Or is the cognition by a preexisting mind, or soul entity? Which strikes the mind as most reasonable? The transformation of physical energy into mentality is necessary in the scheme of psycho-physical materialism and so it is assumed, but the assumption is without a shadow of scientific observation to support it. The resulting correlate and the only correlate which has ever been ascer-

tained by measurment is a mechanical equivalent. The equivalent in cognition has never been discovered by measurement. The equivalent is purely a matter of speculation.

If ideas are generated in the brain by physiological action what becomes of them? They must be "stored up" and remain intact *as ideas* somehow and somewhere, otherwise the vivid recalling of incidents, or ideas originating subjectively which had remained subconsciously for many years, cannot be accounted for. Is it possible that abstractions can become permanently incorporated in tangible organic substance, so that such organic matter may become intellectualized? Abstract thought cannot exist in the brain without being identified with something that possesses duration. If it is not the phenomenal action of soul entity, or soul personality what is it? It must be that ideas not only become incorporated with organic substance, but must somehow become capable of co-ordination, or as Mr. Spencer has it, "compounded and recompounded" so that the process of reasoning may be carried on—so that continuous coherent thinking on some abstruse subject may be carried on—so that a Sir Isaac Newton may discover how the worlds are held in their orbits—so that a Leverrier and an Adams may locate Neptune by ciphering on a slate—so that a Christ may revolutionize the moral life of mankind.

In thinking about any subject we mentally use the language we use in talking about it, just as we think the words we use in writing about it. In solving mathematical problems we mentally see the figures used in the computation. It must be that in language forms, ideas are retained in memory. What is acquired is often forgotten for many years; is as absent from con-

sciousness as if it had never been known. When recurring to consciousness it recurs in the form of spoken or written language in which it was acquired, or what is more remarkable may be acquired in a language which may be entirely forgotten, and afterwards be recalled and communicated in a language subsequently acquired. While the language form in which it was acquired is forgotten the thought, the idea survives in the memory subconsciously. All the while the subject matter in general terms must be subsisting subconsciously somehow and somewhere, so that it may be recalled in another form entirely different from that in which it was acquired. This may be by mental direction, or it may occur suddenly and involuntarily while the mind is occupied upon a subject in no respect relating to, or bearing upon, the same subject. Upon the theory that the acquisition is a mechanico- or chemico-physiological process transforming and fixing the thought in the brain-cells, this mechanical mode of acquiring knowledge would seem to so fix knowledge in the form in which it is acquired as that the idea and the form would be inseparable and not subject to be recalled in a different form. It would seem no more possible to translate it into a different form of expression, than by volition to change the direction of nerve reflex action which occurs on the infliction of an injury, so that the resulting pain would be felt in a part remote from the seat of the injury. And this would seem also to preclude the possibility that the acquisition and communication of knowledge could be the correlative action of a mechanical force. And it would seem also that this literal mechanical acquisition would forbid the idea of lapses in memory so long as the brain remains in normal condition; and it would seem reasonable that in brain decay of old

age memory of what had been acquired in youth would fade away as certainly as what is acquired in old age.

A formidable difficulty to be encountered in accepting the physiological materialistic hypotheses arises out of the fact of the several total changes of brain substance which occur in the course of a life of average duration. In the disintegration and excretion of chemico-physiological action in brain structure and the repositing of a new material by the nutritive process, involving frequent total changes from the old to the new, though retaining identity of form, what might be expected to be the effect upon the mind-fund?—the accumulation of former mental experiences? The nutrition of the brain structure, and the acquisition of mental experiences, are independent and wholly unlike processes and come from independent sources. The one comes from the digestion and assimilation of food. The other from experiences received through the external organs of sense, or from subjective ideation. Now, in the disintegration and secretion by chemico-physiological action of brain substance which contains or has been impressed by, or has become intellectualized by, these mental processes, what becomes of these registered experiences, or of this organized thought? It would seem that the mentality thus acquired must necessarily disappear with the old tissue when eliminated. In this process of eliminating of the old and repositing of the new brain substance, how is it possible that former mental experiences can be retained? It would seem to be impossible. Nor seem possible that they can be renewed without the identical recurrence of the former mental experiences, which, of course, is obviously impossible. And so does not physiological materialism refute itself?

## VII

## EVOLUTION AND THE SOUL

"The discussion of man's place in nature and his derivation from less developed forms of animal life, which is sometimes known as anthropogenesis, or anthropogeny, formed one of the first and most hotly contested discussions in the history of the doctrine of evolution, while no consensus has yet been reached in regard to the derivation of mental endowments from those of the higher animals, or the precise relation of the two to each other." (Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology," 1901, title *Anthropology*.)

Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace, the illustrious and still surviving contemporary of Darwin, and an original and independent explorer in the field of evolution, dissents from Darwin as to the origin of the mental faculties characteristic of man. He particularly instances the accomplishments of men of high talents and genius in mathematics, in art, and in music as being so exceptional, and above the general level of development in the qualities essentially distinguishing men from animals, and therefore common to all men whether savage or civilized, that they could not have originated in the evolutionary process by variation and natural selection. There are certain mental traits common to the race differentiating man and animals and without which he would not be man. The mathematical, the artistic, and the musical,

in which particulars a limited few of the race have been so transcendently distinguished, do not belong to these necessary and common mental traits, but yet may be considered as illustrations of the possible, perhaps probable, future development of the entire race, and so could not have originated in the biological law of variation, and of natural selection; and, as Wallace says in his book on "Darwinism," they must have been "superadded" from some other source. These "special faculties . . . clearly point to the existence in man of something which he has not derived from his animal progenitors—something which we may best refer to as being of a spiritual essence or nature, capable of progressive development under favorable conditions. On the hypothesis of this spiritual nature, super-added to the animal nature of man, we are able to understand much that is otherwise mysterious or unintelligible in regard to him, especially the enormous influence of ideas, principles, and beliefs over his whole life and actions. Thus alone we can understand the constancy of the martyr, the unselfishness of the philanthropist, the devotion of the patriot, the enthusiasm of the artist, and the resolute and persevering search of the scientific worker after nature's secrets. Thus we may perceive that the love of truth, the delight in beauty, the passion for justice, and the thrill of exultation with which we hear of any act of courageous self-sacrifice, are the workings within us of a higher nature which has not been developed within us by the struggle for material existence."

And again, the three distinct steps of progressive development from (1) the "inorganic to organic, when the earliest vegetable cell, or the living protoplasm out of which it arose, first appeared," to the next stage (2) "still more marvelous, still more completely beyond all

possibility of explanation by matter, its laws and forces," the "introduction of sensation or consciousness, constituting the fundamental distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms"; and (3) the final stage where there appears "in man a number of his most characteristic and noblest faculties, those which raise him furthest above the brutes and open up possibilities of almost infinite advancement"—point clearly to an unseen universe—to a world of spirit, to which the world of matter is altogether subordinate."

The distinguished author does not formulate a hypothesis as to how, and at what stage of the evolutionary process, the spiritual nature was superadded to the animal nature of man. He only states his general conclusion that the origin of the mental faculties characteristic of men "could only find an adequate cause in the unseen universe of spirit."

How or when organisms first appeared does not admit of a solution upon any theory of the laws, or processes or forces relating to inorganic matter yet disclosed by science. Natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, does not afford any solution as that theory begins with existing organisms. To attribute their origin to spontaneous generation explains nothing. That hypothesis, starting out with the absolute non-existence of organic matter, requires its production by inorganic processes, the arranging, or combinations of inorganic atoms—the atoms of carbon as it is said. The greatest among the scientists, notably Lord Kelvin, Tyndall, Huxley, deny its possibility. Haeckel, however, seems to be as confident that organic matter did so originate as if he had been present when the thing was done. In his "Riddle" he says "The hypothesis of spontaneous generation and the allied carbon-theory may be considered the



chemical basis of life . . . First simple monera are formed by spontaneous generation, and from these arise unicellular protists . . . From these unicellular protists arise in the further course of evolution, first social cell-communities, and subsequently tissue forming plants and animals."

But the concern here is with organic evolution only so far as it relates to the chief theme of this writing. The theory of organic evolution by natural selection as advanced by Darwin appears to have given the negationists a more confident scientific footing than they had before the time of Darwin. But what is the meaning of natural selection which is the chief factor in that method of evolution?

Baldwin's Dictionary above cited thus defines it: "The theory that the struggle for life due to the rate of multiplication of animals and plants and other conditions, results in the survival of those individuals having the most advantageous variations; and thus leads by accumulation through a series of generations to evolution." Under the title "Existence" it is said: "Three clearly distinguishable forms of struggle for existence may be distinguished.

"(1) The competition for food, etc., that arises among organic beings through over production.

"(2) Competition in any form of active contest in which individuals are pitted against one another.

"(3) Survival due to greater fitness for life in a given environment, whether combined with direct competition with other organisms or not.

"The second case (2) is that in which animals (a) fight with, or (b) prey upon, one another, only the former of these having any analogy to the form of competition due to a limited supply of food, etc.,"

"The third case of 'struggle' (3) is that in which individuals struggle against fate—the inorganic environment—not against one another. . . . The distinction between cases (2) and (3) disappears in instances in which the animal accommodates actively to meet his enemies, which then become part of his environment, in the sense of case (3)." . . .

"In recent evolution theory the doctrine of natural selection has come to rest more and more on the second and third sorts of struggle (2) and (3), and less on the Malthusian conception (1)" that is to say, more and more on the chances of survival in the struggle for a living (2), or the struggle against fate (3). And again under the title "Selection": "Apart from sexual selection, consciousness plays its part in the struggle for existence among all the higher animals, though its effects are difficult to disentangle from those of unconscious selection." What the author means by the "conscious selection of the higher animals" we gather from the following thus: "Here the effects are wrought through an appeal to the consciousness of the organism—though there is no purposive end in view, beyond, at most, immediate gratification," and "Where animals, for example, prey upon one another, consciousness as a factor cannot be excluded." This, of course, simply means organic desire, organic appetite, organic passion.

Mr. Wallace in his "Darwinism" says that "The theory of natural selection rests on two main classes of facts which apply to all organized beings without exception, and which thus take rank as fundamental principles or laws. The first is, the power of rapid multiplication in a geometrical progression; the second, that the offspring always varies slightly from the parents, though generally very closely resembling them.

From the first fact or law there follows, necessarily, a constant struggle for existence; because, while the offspring always exceed the parents in number, generally to an enormous extent, yet the total number of living organisms in the world does not, and cannot, increase year by year. Consequently every year on the average, as many die as are being born, plants as well as animals; and the majority die premature deaths. They kill each other in a thousand different ways; they starve each other by some consuming the food that others want; they are destroyed largely by the powers of nature—by cold and heat, by rain and storm, by flood and fire. There is thus a perpetual struggle among them which shall live and which shall die; and this struggle is tremendously severe because so few can possibly remain alive—one in five, one in ten, often only one in a hundred or even one in a thousand." Now, in the very nature of things, this struggle for existence—the enormous destruction on the one hand and the survival of the few on the other, does not proceed upon any "fundamental principle or law." In another place after writing "On the Advance of Organization by Natural Selection" the author says: "but this remarkable advance in the higher and larger groups *does not imply any universal law of progress in organisation* (italics by the present writer) because we have at the same time numerous examples (as has already been pointed out), of the persistence of the lowly organized forms, and also of absolute degradation or degeneration."

Mr. Lock in his book on "Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution," 1906, says: "Selection whether natural or artificial, can indeed of itself have no power in the direction of creating anything new; its influence is destructive or preservative,

but nothing more than this." But enough of this. Enough has been quoted from writers of generally recognized authority, to show that the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection does not mean progressive development in *accordance with fundamental law—with orderly, purposive, cosmical law.*

If, then, in the Darwinian scheme of evolution, progressive development is chiefly—as some maintain wholly (Lockante)—due to natural selection; and if natural selection has not proceeded according to fundamental cosmic law, uniform and orderly in operation, is it not fair to say that what it amounts to is, that in the lottery-wheel of natural events—the vast and varied changes of environment which have transpired over land and sea since the time when the "earth was without form and void"—John Fiske's "finished product" was the creature of accident; that it is due to a fortunate series of accidents that he did not turn out to be some other and entirely different animal. Truly, if during all the infinite eons prior to the advent of man, there could have existed an intelligent looker-on in the work-shop of nature, there would have prevailed a feeling of uncertainty whether such a creature as man would ever have come into existence at all.

But there were "breaks" of continuity in the evolutionary process which the Darwinians could not account for, and which Mr. Darwin conceded presented difficulties in the way of its universal acceptance which could not be overcome except upon the supposition that the geological record is imperfectly known; and while it is true, as stated by Mr. Wallace in his "Darwinism," that the geological record and other data are now more accessible than they were to Mr. Darwin, it is still true that there are "breaks" which eminent scientists contend

never can be filled by the theory of natural selection. Huxley, as stated in Baldwin's Dictionary, "was never completely convinced of the efficacy of natural selection" for reasons briefly given under that title. As long ago as June, 1859, he wrote to his friend, Sir Charles Lyell (Life and Letter by his son,) that "The fixity and definite limitations of species, genera, and large groups appear to me to be perfectly consistent with the theory of transmutation. In other words, I think *transmutation* may take place without transition." . . . "All my studies lead me to believe more and more in the absence of any real transitions between natural groups, great and small—but with what we know of the physiology of conditions this opinion seems to me to be quite consistent with transmutation." . . . "I by no means suppose that the transmutation hypothesis is proven or anything like it. But I view it as a powerful instrument of research. Follow it out, and it will lead us somewhere; while the other notion is like all modifications of final causation, a barren virgin." Again, in 1894, in writing to Mr. Bateson, who holds that species may originate by a single variation—a single step—he said: "I see you are inclined to advocate the possibility of considerable 'Saltus' on the part of Dame Nature in her variations. I always took the same view, much to Mr. Darwin's disgust, and we used often to debate it." And Professor LeConte, without being an avowed mutationist, in his book above cited said: "Causes or forces are consistent but phenomena everywhere and in every department of nature are *paroxysmal*."

The theory of evolution thus foreshadowed, known as the Mutation theory, which discards the influence of external and fortuitous conditions in the production of species, and according to which a fully "co-ordinated set

of structures can and does arise in an already perfected condition at a single step, and that such phenomena take place with sufficient frequency to give ample opportunity for the survival of the new types so arising" (Lock, in the book above cited) appears to be supplanting the theory of evolution by natural selection. "Trivial variants are not the only ones that play a role in evolution. De Vries (1901) has gone to the extent of denying that trivial variations have any part in the origin of species." (Baldwin's Dictionary, title *Variation*.) And again in the same work under the title *Mutation*, it is said: "De Vries' views are thus directly opposed to the common form of the theory of evolution." . . . "De Vries' experiments support the results arrived at by Scott and other paleontologists that there is no evidence in the successive strata of the earth of a gradual development of one species into another and that everything points at small, but sudden transitions." Certainly the vast and transcendent changes from the inorganic to the vegetable, and from the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to man, cannot be accounted for on the theory of natural selection. Whatever may be the function of natural selection in the production of varieties of the same species, and in preventing the destruction of species by the numerous adverse conditions, and especially by an excessive multiplication of animal life beyond the means of living, it seems to be fairly shown that the production of species is not due to external and fortuitous conditions but to the operation of fundamental cosmic law which produced organisms in the first place, and by subsequent distinct and specific acts of variation and heredity. However and whatever the causes by which sudden and discontinuous variations are operative, whether or no in the germ-cells, it is enough for the

present purpose that they are internal and organic.

On first blush the introduction of the subject of evolution in considering the theme to which this essay is chiefly devoted, may not appear relevant. With deference to the many devout men of science who have persuaded themselves that they can see the hand of God in the theory of evolution as maintained by the Darwinians, and who hold that it is consistent with the idea that man is endowed with a substantial spiritual entity capable of perpetual existence in another life, its tendency does seem to cast serious doubt upon the probability of a future state of existence. It certainly places all animal life, including man, upon a dead level as to origin and mode of physical development; but since there is a general consensus of belief among its advocates, that man's spiritual nature is the product of the same evolutionary process which produced his physical frame, and that his spiritual nature is the same in kind as that of the lower animals, and that the moral element in his spiritual nature differs only in degree from that of animals, it is in effect held that his bodily death is the finality of his existence. Upon this theory wherein is there any greater reason to believe that the spirit of man will survive mortality, than that his body will be revived to eternal life?

On the other hand, in the theory of evolution by virtue of the cumulative effect and sudden progressive stages of development by internal vital forces uninfluenced by, and independent of environment and natural selection, whereby higher planes of existence are attained, we have a clearer conception that each stage of progressive development is due to cosmic law wearing the aspect of Omniscient design; every stage presaging the epochal event of the appearance of a being who for the first time

in biological history, possessed mental as distinguished from organic consciousness, and endowed with the faculty of discerning moral distinctions, the radical difference between the morally right and the morally wrong. In this last transcendent mutation, an entirely new plane of existence was reached. The highest physical development was attained when the animal became erect with a great dome of brain surmounting the physical structure. This supreme physical structure for the first time became an appropriate organism for the incarnation of the new self-conscious, rationalizing being.

In the vast and sudden mutation from the lower to the higher stages of development which have gone before, we have the reason and analogy that in the arrest of development of the physical man, and the continuing development of his intellectual and moral nature, when this fleshy and decaying cerement falls away, there will occur a transcendent spiritual mutation to a higher plane of existence beyond the limitations of mortality.

If the history of the mutation from the anthropoid to man fills the mind with an oppressive sense of intellectual helplessness, it is, after all, no greater than the mutation in some sense repeated in the life of every individual man. This individual mutation, perhaps better serves as an illustration than as a complete analogy, since it is not the origin of a new species. It is the renewal and perpetuity of a species which has been fixed time beyond the history recorded in silt and cave. The mightiest of earth begins his career in a little, rounded protoplasmic cell scarcely perceptible, if at all, to natural vision. And we have the great authority of Huxley for saying that, "not only men, and horses, and cats and dogs, lobsters and beetles, periwinkles and muscles, but even the very sponges and animalcules



commence their existence under forms which are essentially undistinguishable."

What is it that always, everywhere, under all conditions in a short time transcendently differentiates the microscopical germ cell issuing from the human matrix, from the germ cell of "cats and dogs, lobsters and beetles"? Whence comes it but from the cosmic law in which Almighty God is ever immanent?

In this new cell, thus formed by the fusion of the two sexual cells, there is as distinctly the beginning of a new being physically and spiritually, and as marvelous, and *a priori* as incredible, as the legend in the book of Genesis wherein it is related that God said "let us make man in our own image, after our likeness." According to recent biological revelations it is now made apparent that in the nuclei of these cells there are minute bodies distinguished by a jaw-breaking terminology invisible except through a microscope of high magnifying power, which bear the composite heredity of the two ancestral lines. This was the microscopic genesis of the mighty genius who wrote Hamlet and Mid Summer Night's Dream. And yet the eminent Professor Haeckel would see in this nothing more than a "chemical compound of carbon"—just a common-place "physico-chemical process," and a duration of existence and destiny as trivial, and compared with the everlasting, as transient as that of the "fly of the summer's day," or the green scum of a stagnant pond. What extravagance of crudulous incredulity is the negative man of science not capable of in his reaction against the "superstition" of belief in God and the eternal duration of the spirit of man!

And now a marvelous change takes place; a sudden mutative change from the latent and inert to active vitality. The energy of a new life is manifested. There

is distinctly the appearance and beginning of development of a new being—a being which had not existed in possibility as long as these sexual cells remain separate. In the fusion each cell contributes a mysterious something essential to constitute the life of the new being. And not only does a new being begin to live, but there is the beginning in that new personality of a new mentality like in kind the mentality of other but distinctly individual human beings.

On the completion of fetal life there occurs a paroxysmal birth into a new mode of existence wholly unlike intra-uterine life. Whereas, while dwelling in the world of waters, the inspiration of air would cause the fetus to drown, on the instant of birth the lungs must have atmospheric air or the young life would instantly end. The mode of nutrition is instantly and entirely changed. One moment, life depends upon the blood of the mother; the next moment life must be sustained by nutrition derived through the alimentary apparatus. Really, are not these sudden changes as distinctly and marvelously mutative as the physical mutation from the anthropoid ape long ago extinct to man?

## VIII

## IDEATIONAL PROCESSES—"UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRATION"

It is a contention of psychologists that ideas never recur as originally conceived. This tends to corroborate the theory that they originate in a *something* independent of physical substance. Ideas are not subjects. They are only phenomenal manifestations of something that thinks. That *something* must be a continuing permanent entity in which ideas not only originate, but retain the substance of what has been thought, and which possesses the power of reproducing similar ideas. It is clear that that *something* possesses the power of discrimination between the true and the false, of selecting out the material from the immaterial, the relevant from the irrelevant; possesses the power of testing propositions, problems, hypotheses, by rules of logic and probabilities, the capacity to increase and develop by internal volitional and spontaneous ideation after the withdrawal or cessation of inciting causes. If thinking were a physical process it would seem that these phenomena could not occur in so many varied forms, and that ideas would recur precisely as first received. Ideation would be mechanical and inflexible. Upon the physical hypothesis, one naturally inquires what it is that feels the various emotions which occur in human experience? What it is that feels pleasure on performing a virtuous action? One can understand very well what physical comfort is when one is

free from pain, when hunger is appeased, when digestion is healthy, when sleep is normal, when all reasonable physical wants are supplied. But what is it that feels happiness, joy, in the performance of good deeds, or in witnessing the benevolent, humane, or philanthropic conduct of others? Is it the cortex, the grey matter, of the brain? Or is it the sensory ganglia generally? Or is it an all-pervading sensation of the sympathetic system of nerves? Is it that tissue is gratified? We can understand what physical discomfort is. We can understand that an inflamed nerve will cause a tooth to ache; that a diseased nerve will cause neuralgia or sciatica. But where is the seat of the pain caused by a wicked action; of the distress caused by witnessing or hearing of the cruelty inflicted by others? The seat of grief? Of remorse? These feelings and emotions must *reside in or spring out of something* and indicate more than transient phenomena; for they often endure for years, sometimes for life, without a repetition of the original cause. If there is nothing but the physical it must be that organic matter is the seat of these sensations. It must be that organic matter feels remorse for having performed a mean or cruel deed, or grief or distress on seeing the misfortune of others.

Arguing inferentially from the effect of abnormal conditions of certain parts or organs that mentality is due to chemico-physiological processes occurring in such parts or organs, it is hardly too much to say that the negationists would find as much support in pathological conditions of the thyroid gland, a small ductless gland situated in front of the trachea as from anything that may be observed in disordered conditions of the brain. The mental and physical effects following upon the atrophy or excision of that gland cannot be better

stated than by Professor Du Bois, in his little monograph on "The influence of the Mind on the Body." "A typical example of this action of the body upon the mind is furnished to us by the destruction of the thyroid gland. In other times in operations for goiter, which have become so frequent to-day, the whole gland was removed, upon the pretext that it was useless. It has become necessary to retract this opinion. It has happened that people who were normal before have fallen after the operation into a state of imbecility. Not only are the features swollen, the forehead wrinkled, the lips heavy, the face even taking a senile look; but the intelligence has suffered and the patient has fallen into a state of intellectual torpor. The same conditions can occur without an operation by the atrophy of the thyroid gland.

"Now in both cases we can give back to the patient his intelligence, his vivacity of spirit, by making him eat the thyroid gland of the sheep or take pills made of the extract of that gland! We can plunge him again into idiocy by stopping his pills and render him intelligent anew by giving him a prescription to the chemist." No more remarkable physical and intellectual effects are to be observed in disorders of that part of the brain generally thought to be the seat of mentality. And is it too far fetched to say that there is as much evidence in this degenerative and regenerative process connected with pathological conditions of the thyroid gland to support the materialistic theory that mental phenomena are due to chemico-physiological activity occurring in that gland, as that it is due to such activity occurring in the cerebrum?

## IX

## UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRATION.

"Unconscious Cerebration," a term used by Professor Carpenter in his book on "Mental Physiology," is an important factor in considering the probability of the existence of a separate soul personality. It is well authenticated that higher reaches of the purely intellectual have been attained subconsciously in notable individual instances, than the same individual has been capable of by conscious effort. It is a not uncommon experience that the mind seems to act unconsciously, as, for instance, when one has for a time been considering a question of difficulty, and having given it up as unsolved, or unsolvable, has suddenly been surprised, in the midst of thought upon an entirely different subject, by a clear revelation of what has before been sought in vain. Professor Carpenter, in his book, thus quotes from Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, eminent in philosophy, poetry, and science, as writing in his book on "Mechanism in Thought and Morals:" "I question whether persons who think most—that is, have most conscious thought pass through their minds—necessarily do most mental work. The tree you are sticking in 'will be growing while you are sleeping.' So with every idea that is planted in a real thinker's mind: it will be growing when he is least conscious of it. An idea in the brain is not a legend carved

on a marble slab: it is an impression made on living tissue, which is the seat of active nutritive processes. Shall the initials I carved in bark increase from year to year with the tree? And shall not my recorded thought develop into new forms and relations with my growing brain?"

"Our *definite ideas* are stepping-stones; how we get from one to the other, we do not know: something carries us; *we* (i. e. our conscious selves) do not take the step.

A creating and informing spirit, which is *with us*, and not *of us*, is recognized everywhere in real and storied life; . . . it comes to the least of us as a voice that will be heard; it tells us what we must believe; it frames our sentences; it lends a sudden gleam of sense or eloquence to the dullest of us all; we wonder at ourselves, or rather not at ourselves, but at this divine visitor, who chooses our brain as his dwelling-place, and invests our naked thought with the purple of the kings of speech or song." Sir William Hamilton, the great metaphysician of Edinburgh, is quoted as having said in one of his lectures: "I do not hesitate to affirm that what we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of."

Many illustrative instances are cited by Professor Carpenter, among the more notable are here quoted. In a letter to a friend, Sir Rowan Hamilton wrote:

"To-morrow will be the fifteenth birthday of Quaternions. They started into life, or light, full-grown, on the sixteenth of October, 1843, as I was walking with Lady Hamilton to Dublin, and came up to Brougham Bridge. That is to say, I then and there felt the galvanic circuit of thought *close*; and the sparks which fell from it were the *fundamental equations between i, j, k, exactly*

*such* as I have used them ever since, I pulled out on the spot, a pocket-book, which still exists, and made an entry, on which *at the very moment*, I felt that it might be worth my while to expend the labor of at least ten (or it might be fifteen) years to come. But then it is fair to say that this was because I felt a *problem* to have been at that moment *solved*—an intellectual *want relieved*—which had *haunted* me for at least *fifteen years before*."

The following instances were communicated to the author by the gentleman in whose experience they occurred:

"When at school, I was fond of trying my hand at geometrical problems. One baffled me. . . . Some years after, and when the problem had not been touched by me for some time, I had been sitting up till the small hours, deciphering a cryptograph for one of my pupils. Exulting in the successful solution, I turned into bed; and suddenly there flashed across my mind the secret of the solution of the problem I had so long vainly dealt with. . . . The effect on me was strange, I trembled as if in the presence of another being who had communicated the secret to me.

"Another time, an algebraic sum had plagued me for a day or two. I could not get the desired result. Some weeks after, on returning from a social gathering, I retired, thinking of the pleasant evening I had spent; when suddenly it flashed across me that there was an error in the sum as set. I leaped out of bed with the same mysterious feeling upon me, wrote down the involved expression with the suggested correction, worked the sum, and obtained the desired result. Strange to say, some weeks afterwards I took the sum from the book, but could not discover what change should be made; and



it was not until I found the scrap of paper upon which I had worked it that night, that I could correct the sum in the book." These examples are almost startling instances of the repeated failure to solve difficult problems by conscious effort and their involuntary solution by "unconscious cerebration."

But what is most remarkable is the action of mind in difficult and coherent processes of rationalizing, and the inconceivable rapidity with which "long trains of thought" pass through the mind in dreaming, when the functions of the physical senses and volition are suspended in the unconsciousness of sleep.

Dr. Carpenter cites the famous case of the composition of the poetical fragment "Kubla Kahn" by Coleridge while asleep; and quotes from Dr. Abercrombie's work on the "Intellectual Powers," the case of a distinguished Scottish lawyer:

"This eminent person had been consulted respecting a case of great importance and much difficulty; and he had been studying it with intense anxiety and attention. After several days had been occupied in this manner, he was observed by his wife to rise from his bed in the night, and go to a writing desk which stood in his bedroom. He then sat down, and wrote a long paper which he carefully put by in his desk, and returned to bed. The following morning he told his wife that he had had a most interesting dream—that he had dreamed of delivering a clear and luminous opinion respecting a case which had exceedingly perplexed him; and that he would give anything to recover the train of thought which had passed before him in his dream. She then directed him to the writing desk where he found the opinion clearly and fully written out; and this was afterward found to be perfectly correct."

In the "Library of Universal Knowledge," (American Edition of "Chambers' Encyclopedia") title *dreaming*, instances are related of the rapidity of mental action in sleep. "A dream requiring hours for its accomplishment, is begun and terminated in a few seconds. A person who was suddenly aroused from sleep by a few drops of water sprinkled in his face, dreamed of the events of an entire life in which happiness and sorrow were mingled, and which finally terminated with an altercation upon the borders of an extensive lake, in which his exasperated companion, after a considerable struggle, succeeded in plunging him. Dr. Abercrombie relates a similar case of a gentleman, who dreamed that he had enlisted as a soldier, joined his regiment, deserted, was apprehended, carried back, tried, condemned to be shot, and at last led out for execution. After all the usual preparations, a gun was fired; he awoke with the report, and found that a noise in an adjoining room had both produced the dream and aroused him from sleep. Sir Benjamin Brodie, in his *Psychological Inquiries* (1854), mentions the following anecdote of the late Lord Holland: "On an occasion when he was much fatigued, while listening to a friend who was reading aloud, he fell asleep and had a dream, the particulars of which it would have occupied him a quarter of an hour or longer to express in writing. After he awoke, he remembered the beginning of one sentence, while he actually heard the latter part of the sentence immediately following it, so that probably the whole time during which he had slept, did not occupy more than a few seconds." Many facts of the same kind are on record. It is from cases of this nature that Lord Brougham has been led to the opinion that *all* our dreams really take place in the act of falling asleep or of awaking.

In the cases above related, it would seem absurd to attribute mental activity to chemico-physiological processes. If in waking life it may seem possible with some show of reason, from the standpoint of the materialist, to assume that rationalizing is the product of chemico-physiological action stimulated by conscious direction through the nervous system, and possibly to attribute the sudden and unexpected solution of difficult mental problems, to the remote association of ideas, there can be no ground for such assumption when such mental action occurs in sleep.

## X

## MEMORY—BRIGHTEST AS THE PHYSICAL FAILS

The most important attribute of the mind is memory; and no mental attribute so significantly distinguishes man from animals, nor so significantly differentiates the psychic and the physical. It is by memory that knowledge which has been acquired through the senses, or by subjective ideation, is held fast in intellectual subconsciousness to be recalled at will, or to recur spontaneously as one may desire to think about, and reflect upon it, to utilize it. There can be no mental acquisition without it. The present is but an instant. In an instant the present becomes the past; and so without memory the instant of the recognition of a fact, or of subjective spontaneous thought, would be the instant of its final disappearance from consciousness.

What is it that remembers? In what condition, or state of existence, are ideas during the time that they are beneath the state or condition of consciousness? For it is certain that they must inhere or be contained in something, else they could not be recalled to consciousness. Being processes they cannot be retained in the cerebral cells as pure abstractions. Phenomena cannot think. They cannot remember. It is the *something* that

produces thought that thinks; that is the *something* that remembers. Haeckel in his "Riddle" says: "memory is the work of certain cerebral cells in man and in animals." This is Haeckel's physiological materialism. But how do the cerebral cells "work"? The term "work," as used by Haeckel, embraces the whole process of spontaneous subjective ideation, and the intellectual perception of what comes to these cells from the external world through the telegraphic nervous system. This hypothesis means that the brain cells which constitute the mass of the tissue of the brain, do the "work" of independent, original, abstract, ideation, often of the most difficult and abstruse character, without stimulation received through the organs of sense, and the retaining of the ideas thus originating, by registration in these cells in some manner impossible to conceive; and also the mechanical registering of the thoughts of others which have been memorized in youth, and the power to literally repeat the same when this brain tissue is shriveling and decaying with old age. When the assimilation which means growth in youth, and is equal to disintegration in the full fruition of mature life, is giving way to the decline which ends in the general physical decrepitude of advanced age, it is often seen that memory recalls with startling minuteness the trivial events of childhood. Why is it that the "register" is thus preserved while all else is giving way to decay? These cells must be subject to the physiological laws of nutrition and excretion which, as has been seen, change the old for the new. It is purely a physical process—chemico-physiological in character.

On the theory that the physical is endowed with soul personality, that the physical incarnates the spiritual entity, it is withal true that the only means of communi-

cation this spiritual entity has with the external world is by means of the physical organs of sense, constantly subject to varying and often injurious conditions and imperfections. The physical is the vehicle, the containing medium, and so, as the containing physical organism becomes infirm from disease, or decays by reason of old age, it must be true that recent mental experiences are less impressive, the acquisition of new ideas more difficult. On the other hand when the means of communication with the external world are in healthful and normal condition, and internal, subjective ideation is least clouded and encumbered by the physical embodiment, mental experiences are more vivid and lasting, and, as is often observed in old age the experiences of the earlier years recur in minutest detail.

That the mental experiences of an entire life have been known to be reproduced with the utmost and minutest distinctness in not many seconds of time as the consciousness of physical existence ceases, as in the instances when resuscitation has occurred after the very near approach of death, forcibly illustrate and confirm the theory that memory is not a physiological or other material function, but is always more or less conditioned by the physical organization.

The following remarkable instance, quoted by Dr. Maudsley in his "Physiology of Mind," from a letter of Rear-Admiral Sir F. Beaufort to Dr. Wollaston, relating his personal experience on being drowned, is very much in point:

"From the moment that all exertion had ceased—which I imagine was the immediate consequence of complete suffocation—a calm feeling of the most perfect tranquility superseded the previous tumultuous sensations; it might be called apathy, certainly not resignation,

for drowning no longer appeared to be an evil. I no longer thought of being rescued, nor was I in any bodily pain. On the contrary my sensations were now rather of a pleasant cast, partaking of the dull but contented sort of feeling which precedes the sleep produced by fatigue. Though the senses were thus deadened, not so the mind; its activity seemed to the invigorated in a ratio which defies all description, for thought rose above thought with a rapidity of succession that is not only indescribable, but probably inconceivable by anyone who has not been in a similar situation. The course of these thoughts I can even now in a great measure retrace—the event which had just taken place—the awkwardness that had produced it, the bustle it had occasioned, the effect it would have on a most affectionate father, the manner in which he would disclose it to the rest of the family, and a thousand other circumstances minutely associated with home, were the first series of reflections that occurred. They took then a wider range, our last cruise, a former voyage and shipwreck, my school, the progress I had made there, and the time I had misspent, and even all my boyish pursuits and adventures. Thus traveling backwards, every past incident of my life seemed to glance across my recollection in retrograde succession; not, however, in mere outline and collateral feature. In short, the whole period of my existence seemed to be placed before me in a kind of panoramic review, and each act of it seemed to be accompanied by a consciousness of right and wrong, or by some reflection on its cause or its consequences; indeed many trifling events which had long been forgotten, then crowded into my imagination, and with the character of recent familiarity. . . . The length of time that was occupied with this deluge of ideas, or rather short-

ness of time into which they were condensed, I cannot now state with precision; yet certainly two minutes could not have elapsed from the moment of suffocation to the time of my being hauled up. De Quincey in his essay on the *Palimpsest*, wherein he speaks of the human brain as a "natural and mighty palimpsest" relates a similar instance.

Here we have perfectly credible and forcible illustration and confirmation of the fact that when the functions of animal life are almost entirely suspended, memory flashes out of the recesses of the soul all the incidents and experiences of life with infinity of detail, as photography reveals the invisible stars out of the black abysses of the sky.

To the same purport is the case which Professor Carpenter deems sufficiently credible to be quoted out of "Household Words" (Vol. 9), in his "Mental Physiology":

"A remarkable case is mentioned by a writer (Miss H. Martineau?), of a congenital idiot who had lost his mother when he was under two years old, and who could not have subsequently been made cognizant of anything relating to her; and who yet, when dying at the age of thirty, suddenly turned his head, looked bright and sensible, and exclaimed in a tone never heard from him before, 'Oh, my mother! How beautiful!' and sunk round again—dead."

Neither the physiological materialists, nor any other sect of materialists, have a plausible hypothesis for the explanation of how it is that we remember things that do not happen. There can hardly be registered or "recorded" in the cortex of the cerebrum, or in the cerebral cells, something that does not occur; as for instance, that an appointment has not been kept that was made,



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or that something has been forgotten that was intended to be done, or ought to have been done. It cannot be contended that a register is made of an omission, and yet there is an after remembrance of the omission, or of the fact that something was not done.

## XI

## MEMORY OF ASSOCIATION—RECOGNITION

If it be said that animals as well as man have memory and that, therefore, memory cannot be taken to have much force as evidence of soul personality in man any more than in animals, it is to be replied that there is a clear distinction between intellectual memory—the memory of ideas—and the memory of association.

Man has a remembrance of what has been thought, and a remembrance of objects once perceived by the bodily organs of sense in the absence of the object. This cannot be said of animals. There is no satisfactory evidence that animals possess the power of ideation; that they think and afterward recollect what they thought; or that they retain mental images of objects. But it seems certain that whatever may be the psychic states of animals analogous to true memory may be referred exclusively to association.

For the purpose of this writing association may be best defined by illustration, and association in simplest and plainest form. Association even in man, has really much more to do with influencing action than rationalizing, and in animals is the only form of memory. Recognition in the case of animals is the better term. The memory of association in man in its various forms and phenomena, are exceedingly complex, insomuch that as

said by Wundt in his "Human and Animal Psychology," "Association gives rise to actions whose result is equivalent to that due to the operation of the intellectual functions." A consideration in detail of the reasons which prevail with some of the most eminent psychologists in determining that animals are influenced solely by the memory of association, though they may not present the subject in just these terms, cannot be entered into here. Only general conclusions can be given.

Examples of association experiences in simplest form in man are taken from Professor James' work on "Psychology." The following from his own personal experience we quote: "Thus for instance after looking at my clock just now (1879), I found myself thinking of a recent resolution of the Senate about our legal tender notes. The clock called up the image of the man who had repaired its gong. He suggested the jeweler's shop where I had last seen him; that shop, some shirt studs which I had bought there; they, the value of gold and its recent decline; the latter, the equal value of greenbacks, and this, naturally, the question of how long they were to last, and of the Bayard proposition."

He gives another example from the "Leviathan" of Thomas Hobbes published in 1651. "In a discourse on our present Civil War, what could seem more impertinent than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war introduced the delivering up of the King to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of the treason; and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick."

In the case of animals it is not probable that association is carried to the extent of involving relations and connections as far reaching as in the instances here given, and which are of constant occurrence in the experience of man.

What has been observed by Professor Wundt, whom Haeckel says is regarded in Germany as the most eminent Psychologist living,—in his book above cited on the subject of association in man and animals, is so much in point that coming with the force of his great authority, it is deemed in place to quote what he says somewhat at large:

"It is here, therefore, in the various forms of successive association proper, that the act of interpretation which resolves the mental life of animals into concepts, judgments, and inferences, according to all the rules of logic, finds freest play. But if the whole body of reliable observation is carefully tested, and due regard is paid to the *lex parsimoniae*, which only allows recourse to be had to complex principles of explanation when the simpler ones have proved inadequate, it seems that the entire intellectual life of animals can be accounted for on the simple laws of association. Nowhere do we find the characteristic marks of a true reflection, of any active functioning of imagination or understanding. In saying this, we are, of course, regarding only well-authenticated facts, and not those 'travelers' tales' of which animal psychology has as many as it has wrong explanations of actual observations."

The memory of association in animals is the association of time or place and must be related to or connected with objects or conditions which by recurrence have become more or less familiarized.

And again Professor Wundt: "In very many animals

the development of the organs of speech has gone far enough to enable them to clothe thought in words, if the thought were there to clothe. The question why animals do not talk is most correctly answered in the old way: Because they have nothing to say."

"Indeed, the importance of association for the animal consciousness recalls what we have already said of its value for the human mind. When we began our consideration of the mental life of animals, we condemned the tendency of animal psychology to translate every manifestation of 'intelligence' into an intellectual operation. The same reproach could be made against certain more or less popular views of our own mentality. The old metaphysical prejudice that man 'always thinks' has not yet entirely disappeared. I myself am inclined to hold that man thinks very little and very seldom. . . . Besides this, man is constantly translating acts of logical thought back again into customary associations, and so increasing the sphere and the intellectual consequences of the associational processes. By practice we can reduce anything to association."

But this does not mean so great a disparagement of the human intellect as upon first blush appears. It indicates simply the non-user in the ordinary daily life of even the most enlightened of mankind, of the higher intellectual power of original thinking.

## XII

## FREEDOM OF THE WILL—FATALISM

One of the strongest evidences of soul personality is intellectual and moral freedom, though, to be sure, in a sense, intellectual and moral freedom mean the same thing.

In common parlance this is freedom of the will. It seems self-evident that without this freedom man would be an automatic machine. It is a fundamental principle in the criminal codes of all enlightened nations that there can be no responsibility for acts considered criminal, when the power of the will—the freedom of the will—is suspended. If there is any proposition in psychology to which one would anticipate immediate and universal assent as an original and necessary postulate, it is that of freedom. No proposition would on introspection and personal experience seem to be clearer.

But here again we are met by the fatalism of the atheistic monists and the physiological materialists. In the realm of the psychical in man, as well as animals, they assume as a postulate not to be disputed, that what is commonly understood and universally *felt* to be the power of free choice, is an "illusion of ignorant 'common sense' which, like the vulgar belief that the sun moves round the earth, is utterly dispelled by the light of reason." It being assumed that man's mental and moral nature is the sum-total expression of all the influences,

heritable, physiological, environmental, which enter into its constitution, it is as much organic as his physical structure, and indeed a part of it; and that could we well know the nature of the causes which have entered into the formation of the character of the individual, we could as certainly predict what the individual would do in any given situation as we can predict the consequences of the action of any mechanical force.

The original fiber of physical character transmitted by heredity may be weak and flabby, or strong and virile, depending largely on the degree of prepotency of ancestors. This fiber may be strengthened or weakened by individual environment and habits acquired by personal experiences, and so the will, largely influenced by the physical, may be weak and flabby or strong and resolute, but the element of freedom is always present in consciousness in greater or less degree. It is true that it may be said that the elements entering into the formation of character bear the relation to choice of cause and effect, but it is moral cause, moral influence, and not in the sense that effect is contained in the cause as in logic or physics. It is cause in the sense that predominant motive is a cause, *i. e.*, which may be the variable result of appetite or passion, or greed, or personal advantage of some sort or other, or by the highest consideration of what ought to be morally or intellectually. But all the while there is present the consciousness that something different might have been done; and often on the very threshold of performance some slight reflection or incident changes the course of conduct. History illustrates that the course or fate of empires has turned upon incidents almost as trivial or whimsical as the turning of the hand. No theorizing in support of the dogma of determinism, either theological or phys-

ical, can have weight against the ever present consciousness that one may do or omit to do. Neither good nor evil can have place in a moral sense in an eternal succession of causes and effects wherein effect is contained in cause—wherein effect is the equivalent of cause, since that necessarily excludes volition.

Endowed with the power of self-control, self-development, one can see that there is motive, design, purpose, in his being; that his existence as he is, and as he is capable of becoming, is entirely consistent with the idea of a universal provident cosmic scheme of law in which there are no special providential interferences, no specific creative acts performed.

It is by the power of the will, the freedom of action in resisting temptation to do wrong, and in overcoming the sluggish sense of ease and the selfish feeling to prefer ones own interest at the cost, or to the injury, of others, that moral growth and sound character is promoted and is possible.

To the highly developed moral self-consciousness, there is no evil but sin. All else that mars the happiness of mankind is misfortune. The one man can avoid, whether difficult or not depends on the degree of moral enlightenment and force of will, and so responsibility cannot be avoided. The other, for the most part, he cannot avoid with his present limitations and attended as he is by physical conditions which he cannot control. Volitional selection has taken the place of evolution by natural selection. Free will sits enthroned in the realm of mind and morals; a realm whose laws were not enacted by human legislators, and whose sanctions cannot be enforced by human tribunals.

As to most events occurring in individual experiences, the daily routine of life, the constant recurrence of the



same, or like experiences crystalize into habit, and a sort of secondary or unconscious automatism is acquired. Thus a man by repeated criminality may acquire the habit of doing wrong without reflection; without pausing to weigh and consider the probabilities for and against success, or of evading detection, he may get into a groove of wicked doing. He may acquire the crime habit. This is the unreflecting determining *influence* of formed character—influence without the consciousness of restraint. And were it not for the fact that he may choose to pursue a different course, that he may exert the power to leave off committing crime as was remarkably demonstrated in the case of Jerry McAuley, the founder of the Jerry McAuley mission in New York, and many other instances of the most hardened criminals, he would be irresponsible. And thus also the moral man, the good man, by the long practice of virtuous thinking, and correct doing, may acquire the habit of behaving himself, may acquire the habit of morality; and not until some important emergency arises calling for the conscious exercise of the moral judgment, when temptation is presented to deviate from the beaten path of moral rectitude, is there occasion for the decided exercise of volition. Then he will *know* that he can do the one thing or the other. Then he will *know* that the ego that holds the fortress of the inner life, may surrender, or sturdily stand for honor and virtuous conduct. It is in the higher region of intellectual and moral life, especially the latter, where the strong tests of moral character are applied. Here the exercise of volition is a moral *first cause*, originating in the moral judgment. The multitudes of incidents and experiences favorable to the formation of good character, and the protracted habit of moral doing cannot be considered as proximate

causes of the volitional act. These go to the formation of a sound moral constitution. They go to impart fiber and strength to the moral judgment, just as good habits and good sanitary conditions impart strength and power of resistance to the physical constitution and afford general protection against the causes of disease.

Here the negationist would interpose the objection that this is determinism. Haeckel in his "Last Words on Evolution," says: "Modern physiology shows clearly that the will is never really free in man or in the animal, but determined by the organization of the brain; this in turn is its individual character by the laws of heredity and the influence of the environment." Dr. Paul Du Bois, the eminent Professor of Neuropathology in the University of Berne, in his book on "The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders" thus defines determinism: "The hypothesis of determinism includes neither reflection, nor conversion, nor development." "If we choose, resist, or yield, it is apparent that we are impelled to do so either by the *motive tendencies* of sensation or by *intellectual motives*. We always yield, then, to an attraction or repulsion. It is the liberty of a piece of iron attracted by a magnet." "Analyze any particular action, either the devotion of a martyr or the most shocking crime, and you will always find an imperious motor impulse which has determined the action." The author quotes with approval what a "Philosophic physician, Professor Flournoy" says in his "Metaphysics and Psychology": "It seems to me a desperate undertaking to preserve liberty in the face of a principle that is as definite as that of concomitance, and that is what it amounts to if experimental psychology is the expression of truth itself. . . . the succession of conscious states from the cradle to the tomb is necessarily also

regulated, and as inevitable in each of its terms as the corresponding series of mechanical events." . . . "To explain a fact is always to place it among others where it implicitly belongs, and in virtue of which it could neither not exist nor be otherwise. The fundamental axiom of all science is that of absolute determinism. Science ends where liberty begins." Professor Huxley says: "The feeling we call volition is not the cause of the voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of the act. We are conscious automata." This is believed to be a fair statement of the position of all determinists.

It is true that Professor Du Bois seems to qualify his fatalism by saying: "One also forgets that the fatality which is inevitably connected with the committed act does not predetermine any of the impulsions which are to follow" i.e. if a man commits a wicked act that does not necessarily "predetermine" him to a course of wickedness. But this does not in fact amount to a qualification. The fatality of the hypothesis remains; for according to the hypothesis, at the moment when one is about to perform an act, let it be never so revolting and wicked, the *imperious motor impulse* compels the completion of the act. There can be no recoiling with horror at the apprehension of the consequences of the act. When too late, i.e. after the act, whether by the *imperious "motor tendencies* of sensation" of remorse, or by the *imperious "motor tendencies" of intellectual motives*, a reformed life may be entered upon. But all the while volition is excluded. Conduct is the result of *imperious motor impulse*.

The determinists make the mistake of regarding *motive* as *cause*, and conduct as *effect* in the sense that these terms are used and stand related to each other in

the various departments of science. Their moral code is "summed up in a collection of altruistic sentiments and ideas which are common to civilized people. Whether it is sentimental or rational in the beginning this morality little by little becomes instinctive and automatic. It constitutes what we call "moral consciousness," "without doubt moral-consciousness is not absolute." (Du Bois.) Certainly not "absolute" in the sense that it can exist as an abstract principle in the absence of the relations of man with his fellows; but certainly "absolute" in the field of such relations. In the various departments of the social life it must always mean the same thing to all men or it is of no value. In these social states and relations right must always be governed by the same rules of righteousness, and wrong must always be wrong, else there can be no moral standard common to all men and which always means the same thing. The physiological origin of the moral sense and its "automatic" expression in the daily life of man is the "automatic" morality of Herbert Spencer.

Of course this "automatic" morality logically excludes moral responsibility with its necessary concomitant accountability, whatever the determinists may by their sophistical gymnastics attempt to show to the contrary. It is attended with no sanctions other than the organic penalties consequent upon departure from normal organic functions, and such sanctions as may from time to time prevail under varying social and legal conventions. There is no essential morality in a physiological function. There is no morality in the secretion of the liver. Nor can there be, if "altruistic sentiments" are the product of chemico-physiological processes occurring in the brain cells. Heredity may and does affect favorably or unfavorably the physical agencies of men-

tality. The physical condition inherited may be such that the one may yield easily to evil sensual influences, or the other be able to resist the seductions of sensual gratifications. Physical conditions, as in animals, influence the sensual life of man. Ideas, opinions, immorality, crime habits are not heritable. Environment is owing to accidental conditions.

If the mind or soul is a spiritual entity it cannot in itself be the subject of causes such as produce changes in the constitution of material objects, and cause pathological disorders and decay in organic matter. It cannot become diseased in any sense ever recognized in the physical organism. On the other hand, if mental manifestations are merely phenomena, and are the product of chemico-physiological action, they are not substantive objects and cannot be the subjects of pathological conditions or causes. Mere phenomena cannot become aberrant. In either case sensational impressions made by and through the organs of the physical senses produce mental reactions and emotions which affect favorably or unfavorably the physical organism. In no case can there be mind disease.

But what is to be gained by speculating as to cause and effect? Even the determinist must *feel* that he is free to "change his mind" on the spur of the moment, even on the threshold of action. He often decides to do a thing and the next moment decides not to do it. Can any possible argument as to cause and effect do away with this *feeling*, or break the force of actual experience? All *motive* is *feeling*. The beginning and course of mental activity in every individual life does not depend upon heredity except as influenced by physical conditions which are heritable. Every human being has a mental individuality peculiar to himself. In every

case it is the beginning of a new psychical life, and subsequent development means "increasing psychical energy."

It has been well said that "we shall never have a higher test of truth than universal consent." Of course this refers to moral truths. And so the universal consciousness that we can choose between two or more courses of conduct; in the consciousness that when two or more motives of action are presented to the mind we may elect to pursue the one and reject the other without being conscious of restraint other than the exercise of our moral judgment; that we may reject the one that promises the greatest temporal good or pleasure to ourselves, and elect to pursue that course which promises the good or happiness of others, and which even involves sacrifice on our part, it must be taken that there can be no higher evidence that there is something within us not subject to the unvarying laws which govern matter—something indeed which can and often does effect and control the functions of animal life, not only in ourselves, but in others.

What is asserted of the foreknowledge of God by dogmatic theologues, and formulated in sectarian creeds, has been taken by many to be inconsistent with the doctrine of free will and has long been a source of bitter strife and contention not only among many embracing the Christian faith, but has, no doubt, promoted scepticism and even ribald satire and scoffing among those outside the pale of the church. It must be conceded that to the finite mind of man this is a knotty problem. That God is omniscient, and at the same time omnipotent is universally believed by those who believe in his existence.

And it is difficult to resist the conclusion that,

foreseeing evil, and possessing the power to prevent it, he is the author of evil.

Resting here, as containing all the elements of the problem, man cannot be held responsible for evil, and penalties for evil deeds cannot be maintained to be just. It would be barely admissible to hold that restraints might be imposed upon the dangerously automatic criminal as a matter of safety to society. But why even that? Upon the hypothesis that man is not free, and that there are no sanctions other than human, Goldwin Smith has forcibly said: "One man is a lamb by nature, and another a tiger. Why is not the tiger as well as the lamb to follow his nature as long as the law will let him or he has the power." No one thinks of holding the tiger morally responsible for destroying other animals and man, to gratify its appetite for blood; on what plane of moral responsibility above the animal can the tiger-man be placed if the entire race of man is to die and rot as the tiger with no sanctions beyond the grave? Indeed consistently following out to its brutal result, the logic of his "Riddle," Haeckel avers that "the uneducated man and the savage are just as little 'rational' as our nearest relatives among the mammals (apes, dogs, elephants, etc.)"

Much perplexity concerning God, and freedom, and immortality, comes of finite man assuming and presuming to make God in the image of man, and to measure the extent of his attributes, thoughts, loves, and even his wrath, and his hates, of which we read in the ancient literature of the Hebrews, which has had such controlling, and, to a considerable extent, baneful influence upon what is termed Christian civilization. This much seems clear, that if God has all knowledge, past, present, and future, and is omnipotent, he could have caused

man to come into existence uninfluenced as to his mental and moral nature by his foreknowledge. It is also clear, that man could not have developed mentally and morally by virtue of any resource within himself, nor could he choose between right and wrong, nor believe that anything he might think or do to be essentially morally wrong, if, according to the natural law of his being intellectual and moral as well as physical, there were no such distinctions; if according to such law there were no such states of his being as freedom and immortality. Man being the natural product of eternal, unthinking, unreasoning "iron law," could have no thought, nor perform any act in contravention of that "iron law."

According to the Hebraic legend God constantly interferes in human affairs and controls not only the destiny of nations, but influences the lives of individuals, and so if we accept this legend as true, it must be believed that God is the author of evil as well as good. And what must be the logical result of this belief? Really it discharges man of all moral responsibility. It drives good people to the extremity of illogically and sophistically undertaking to explain as consistent with moral freedom and responsibility occurrences in the life of man which cannot be so explained in terms of common fairness and common sense. Neither good nor evil can exist in the abstract. Neither can exist independently of the relations of mankind to each other. Good and evil are terms of comparison; and if God is the perfect being as he is commonly thought to be, evil is never present in his mind except as he has knowledge of the intents and conducts of man; and the only way that God could be the author of evil would be to create man with the disposition to do evil, which, of course, is unthinkable of a perfect Being.



## XIII

## IS IMMORTALITY A DEAD ISSUE?

An eminent man of science (Professor Osler, now of the University of Oxford) in a recent lecture in the Ingersoll Lectureship of Harvard, on "Science and Immortality," drew a pessimistic picture of the general anti-scientific mind concerning the future life. The following excerpts from his lecture taken somewhat out of their order pretty correctly give the drift of what he said: "Immortality, and all that it may mean is a dead issue in the great movements of the world." "Where among the educated and refined, much less among the masses, do we find any ardent desire for a future life? It is not a subject for drawing-room conversation, and the man whose habit it is to button-hole his acquaintances and earnestly inquire after their souls, is shunned like the Ancient Mariner." "Modern psychological science dispenses altogether with the soul." "The new psychologists have ceased to think nobly of the soul, and even speak of it as a complete superfluity." "The preacher was right; in this matter man hath no preeminence over the beast—'as the one dieth, so dieth the other.'" Is the "modern psychology" mentioned by the lecturer, the psychology of the colleges? If this be so we can well understand why it is that indifferentism as to the future life, or agnosticism, and it may be atheism, are so pre-

valent in the higher institutions of learning. It is true that the eminent man of science near the last word, aimlessly clutching at shadows says, "Some of you will wander through all phases," (of doubt) "to come at last, I trust, to the opinion of Cicero, who had rather be mistaken with Plato than be right with those who deny altogether the life after death; and this is my own *confessio fidei*."

But is it true that the masses of men, and even the men of science are indifferent to the future life? Huxley, the typical agnostic and illustrious in the world of science, in 1883 wrote to his friend John Moreley in a mingled vein of pathos and humor: "it is a curious thing that I find my dislike to the thought of extinction increasing as I get older and nearer the goal.

"It flashes across me at all sorts of times with a sort of horror that in 1900 I shall probably know no more of what is going on than I did in 1800. I had sooner be in hell a good deal—at any rate in one of the upper circles, where the climate and company are not too trying."

The hopes, the ambitions, the vanities, the loves, the hates, the struggles for existence of the race, engross the fleeting years, and serve to divert from serious thought of death and another state of existence. Young and middle aged are prone to thing that death is far away. Even the old have a feeling that other years are still left to them. And so, what may lie beyond this life, for the most part occupies a subordinate place in the thoughts of men. But for all that, there come serious pauses in the life of everyone when solemn thoughts of death and of possibilities beyond the grave whelm the soul with hope or dread.

Surely the millions of money invested in buildings

erected to the worship of God, and the institutions of learning devoted to Christian education, all over the earth, and the millions on millions of people in the various quarters of the globe who weekly assemble in religious devotion, and the many millions of money yearly contributed to missions, go to make up one of the "great movements of the world." In fact, is human society in all nominally Christian lands nearly so much moved in any other direction, when the number of people interested, the influence upon social and domestic relations, the making and execution of the laws, and the immense benevolences fostered by the Christian spirit are taken into consideration? All this springs out of the thought that there must be survival of the morally fit in another life. No other movement is so great, nor so constant, nor so aggressive as this aggregate of forces against the powers of evil. It is certain that belief in the immortality of the soul is the predominant factor in this prodigious movement, even though this be an age of scepticism.

## XIV

THE DIFFERENTIATING MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL  
FACULTIES

No faculty of the mind—the soul—so differentiates man and the lower animals as the moral faculty, the moral attribute of the soul—the power of exercising moral judgment. Since it seems to be true that there are no people wholly destitute of a sense of right and wrong, however perverted that sense may be, it would seem to follow that it must be true that this moral sense is a natural attribute of the human mind. It is true that this faculty, if it exists as a native, race-faculty, seems almost extinct in the lowest tribes. Even many of a much higher degree of development than the lowest, have grossly perverted notions of duty, and of what constitutes right and wrong in morals, even to the extent of regarding as meritorious, actions which in the estimation of the morally enlightened, are held to be atrociously immoral, or wicked. Nevertheless, long and varied experiences of mankind, especially Christian missionaries, with tribes apparently the lowest in the scale of intelligence and morals, have demonstrated their capability of attaining a high degree of excellence.

Mr. Kidd, in his "Social Evolution," has this to say of the aborigines of Australia: "The Australian native has been, by the common consent of the civilized world, placed intellectually almost at the bottom of the list

of the existing races comprising the human family. He has been the zero from which anthropologists and ethnologists have long reckoned our intellectual progress upward. His mental capacity has been universally accepted as being of a very low order. Yet this despised member of the race, possessing usually no words in his native languages for numbers above three, whose mental capacity is reckoned degrees lower than the Demara, whom Mr. Galton compared disparagingly with his dog, exhibits under our eyes powers of mind that should cause us seriously to reflect before committing ourselves hastily to current theories as to the immense gulf between him and ourselves. It is somewhat startling, for instance, to read that in the state schools in the Australian Colonies, it has been observed that aboriginal children learn quite as easily and rapidly as children of European parents; and, lately, that for three consecutive years the aboriginal schools at Remahyack, in Victoria, stood highest of all the state schools of the colony in examination results, obtaining a hundred per cent., on marks." (Citing Rev. John Mathew on the Australian Aborigines. "*Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales.*")

Hon. John M. Creed, M. D., a man of great distinction in Australia, writing of this native race in the "*Independent*" for June 29, 1905, says: "The blacks still run wild as a rule in their almost and quite naked state. Very few have had any opportunity whatever to absorb what was better than the worst qualities of the worst whites. With more experience and better facilities for judging from this view-point than most, I may be permitted to instance a few cases convincing me that the common notion is not quite true that 'they are only a fraction at most above the brute.' For example:

"A black boy was about to be killed according to custom when his parents had lost their lives in battle up in the Blender Ker Ranges, when he was bought by a Scotch naturalist for half a crown and brought up in his family. He is now eighteen. He speaks as pure and grammatical English as any white man, or, with a keen sense of wit, he will drop into the broad Doric Scotch of his adopted father. He graduated very near the head in a class of two hundred and fifty boys in the public school and has since been employed in the drafting-room of one of the largest engineering and ship building establishments in Australia, where the head draftsman told me that he fully held his own with any boy of like education. He sketches with unusual ability and plays The Pipes on the chanter thoroughly enjoying the fun when Scotch skippers asked his employers 'where did you find that black Scotchman'?

"A black baby, brought from the Bush and raised in a village in New South Wales is now about twenty, assisting the blacksmith of the place, who says that he is most efficient, showing more thought and tact and perseverance than the average white apprentice.

"A little fellow twelve years old was taken from a native camp to carry mail at a station. A lady there became interested in him and at odd moments taught him to read and write. He saved his wages, took up land, bought stock and is now rated for taxes at \$50,000. Wishing to interest him in the ethnological studies of his race, I took him over the Australian Museum at Sidney, showing him the specimens of prehistoric implements of Europe, comparing with those in use in remote parts of Australia.

"After this, he said, one cannot avoid accepting evolution, can he? And as we were leaving the Museum, he

said: 'The Whites need not be so conceited, for their ancestors were pretty much like mine, were they not?'

"I listened to a full-blooded black the other day, addressing a crowd of whites in better English than most of them could have spoken, on the culpable extravagance of the State Government."

The experiences of Rev. Dr. John G. Paton, in the New Hebrides, as recorded in his remarkable "Autobiography" afford striking instances of what can be made of the lowest tribes. When he went to the New Hebrides some fifty years ago, he found the natives naked, and cannibals. The first missionaries who had landed on the island of Erromanga were immediately killed and eaten. Their natural barbarism was intensified by the more fertile resources in savage cruelty of the white traders who came to the islands to trade in sandal wood and slaves.

Now the entire population of Erromanga and some of the other islands have become civilized and Christian. Naswai, a chief of the island of Aniwa, addressing a delegation from the island of Fotuna, who had come to see what the missionaries were doing, said, among other things: "As heathens we quarreled, killed and ate each other." When asked to explain Christianity, he said, what could have not been better said by anyone, "Tell them that a man must live as a Christian before he can show what Christianity is." In all that fair region of the globe, where not so many years ago it could be said, "And only man is vile," no negationist was ready to take the chances of being killed and eaten in the cause of "secular morals." At home the negationists were talking about "ghost religions" and "ancestor worship" from which as they contended then as now, these devoted missionaries derived the religion

which impelled them to make their noble and perilous sacrifices.

In America there are well authenticated instances of female infants of white parents being captured by Indians who have grown up to womanhood confirmed in the habits of Indian life; have become wives of Indians, and on being discovered by white relatives have preferred to remain in their savage associations. On the other hand many Indians becoming educated at Carlisle and Hampton and the Haskell Institute, have attained a high degree of intellectual and moral culture. And now that the territory of the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws and Seminoles, have been incorporated with Oklahoma into a new state of the Union, there are many members of these tribes who are qualified by education and native ability to become legislators, judges, governors and members of Congress, and they have proven their ability to succeed in business and professional life.

The untutored savage may not think of conduct or motive, the inward impulse to perform an act beneficial to others, or to perform an act injurious to others, as moral or immoral. Indeed he may feel the highest gratification in inflicting injury on those to whom he is hostile, and may consider such conduct highly meritorious. Nevertheless he must be regarded as possessing, rudimental as it is, the faculty of moral sense, the capacity to develop morally, and to come to know what is intrinsically morally right from what is intrinsically morally wrong.

The culture of progenitors is not transmitted by inheritance. Even the superior physical and mental traits of immediate progenitors are not uniformly so transmitted. It seems to be the rule that the rare prodigies of genius who have marked the highest possibilities of



the human mind, have sprung from lives of the common place, occasionally from dullards, as witness the case of Newton. Now and then there are families from which, either in the male or female line, the prepotency of talented ancestors have prevailed for several generations; but this only in native capacity to acquire or perform under favoring conditions. It may be true that the native capacity of civilized mankind to receive intellectual and moral impressions from the external world by means of advantageous modifications of nerve and brain has been increased by long ages of accumulation and transmission of experiences by heredity, and that there has been a corresponding increase of mental power to co-ordinate, and to subjectively rationalize upon what is thus received, as also increased power of spontaneous subjective thought and reflection.

But no matter how great the increased mental capacity of the race, nor how much the contribution of each succeeding generation to the general fund of knowledge, the individual members of the most enlightened society like the savage, must begin at the bottom. Society advances from age to age, the individual dies. The individual comes into the world as ignorant, and more helpless than the newly born of the higher mammalia. By virtue of the mentality inherited contemporaneously with the physical, the individual may rapidly develop into the marvelous personality and intellectuality of a Newton, a Washington, a Lincoln. The Newton, the Washington, the Lincoln dies, and their mighty thoughts, the example of their mighty deeds, are contributed to the general fund of the ages, and mankind is the wiser and the better for their having lived. The genius of a Newton, and of the few who have signally marked the epochs of thought which have changed and directed into new cur-

rents great movements of mankind, may be a "sport," as said of Newton by Professor Huxley in a letter to Mr. Kingsley in 1863, and, it seems not heritable by personal descendants, but the products of genius are inherited by the race and thus the race advances.

The rapid development of the individual fortunately born to the environment of society highly advanced in all that constitutes the best of modern civilization, is due, as Maudsley puts it, in the first place, to "the rich inheritance of other men's labor, . . . and, secondly the vast amount of human labor and experience which is concentrated in what we call education—that is, in the means and appliances brought to bear even on the humblest child; for these means and appliances represent the accumulated acquisition of ages of human struggle."

Emotion as distinguished from sensation, and the moral judgment as distinguished from the purely intellectual, are the controlling elements or factors in the moral life, and so, a high degree of moral living is compatible with low development of the intellectual faculty. High intelligence is often associated in the same individual with a very low sense of moral obligation.

It is a melancholy fact that notwithstanding the European nations, commonly termed Christian, were the inheritors of the Greek and Roman culture, and notwithstanding the fact that they have had in hand for centuries the New Testament of "good will toward men" and "on earth, peace," they, not so long ago so far reverted to barbarism that they excelled the aboriginal tribes in ingenious devices of cruelty inflicted on people, not for bad conduct, but for mere dissent from tenets decreed by Councils sacriligiously assuming to speak for, and in the stead of God. In the endeavor to enforce

these tenets, provinces were desolated, cities were sacked, prisoners were slaughtered, women were ravished, the brains of babes were knocked out against stone walls. And even in our own times, the lower moral stratum of civilization, whether of high or low social position in popular estimation, is so persistent in tendency to fraud and crime, whether under guise and cloak of corporate combination or individual fraud and felony; so engrossed with the acquisition of things material and showy, to the neglect of personal service to the needy and suffering, that it may be said that the moral margin in favor of this sort of civilization, as against the morality of the aboriginal tribes, may not be so wide as is fondly supposed.

Amid the physical changes and convulsions which have been transpiring on the earth, and the infinite varieties and multitudes of species of animals and plants which have come and gone since the advent of man, the physical man has remained essentially the same. (Huxley's "Man's Place in Nature," Appleton edition 209.) While this is to be said of his physical frame, comparing milleniums with milleniums, it is to be noted that there has been a gradual progressive development of the intellectual and moral attributes of his mental nature. This would seem to be owing to the fact that evolution, whether mainly by external causes according to the Darwinian theory, or by internal causes according to the theory of mutation, ceased to be a physical factor in the case of man, except so far as external conditions have served to produce racial differences and characteristics, when he became erect and self-conscious, and the development of his mentality came to be volitional, depending mainly in his earliest career on the earth upon his physical necessities and primitive preferences, and gradually

increasing moral sense. Instead of being controlled automatically by the blind forces of nature, he had arrived at a period when by his mental attributes he became able to *guide* these mechanical forces in such manner as he conceived would make them serve his conscious purposes.

To say of the moral sense that it originated in animals lower than man by natural selection, or by the survival of the fittest is to attribute its origin and development up to man, wholly to physical causes. Evolution by natural selection, or by survival of the fittest, is a destructive process. It means that progressive development could only be made by the death of the physically unfit. Moral unfitness in the animal had no part in the process. It is a remarkable proposition that the moral sense and moral development could take place mainly or only through the destruction or death of those physically unfit to survive the adverse conditions of environment.

While it is inconceivable that man's mentality, with its distinctive intellectual and moral attributes could originate in physical causes, it is true that its development and activities are largely conditioned and limited by the physical. Hence the place and office of physiological psychology in the estimation of even the devout believer in soul personality and immortality. It is also, true that his moral nature is to a great extent conditioned and limited by his intellectual attributes. The moral sense is constantly subject to direction and often perverted in its judgments by the intellectual and by the physical conditions. The history of what is termed Christian Civilization during some 1600 or 1700 years of this era, affords a fearful illustration of the fact that a lively moral sense may be so perverted in its judgments

by metaphysical dogmas that the strongest and tenderest ties of the human heart may be torn assunder in obedience to the demands of a morbid and distorted sense of duty brought about by metaphysical dogmatism. During the whole recorded history of man there has been no period when the moral sense was so keenly sensitive, and yet so false and cruel in its judgments and activities as during these dark and bloody centuries. And all because of metaphysical distinctions and dogmas concerning the unknown and unknowable, having no essential relevancy to the moral life. Religion was made the instrument of what, in effect, was never more immoral and wicked.

## XV

## THE MORAL SENSE, AND IMMORTALITY

The propositions in the nature of postulates upon which the contention is based that the moral sense is the best evidence according to natural reason of the existence of soul personality and immortality, may be briefly summarized as follows:

(1) The moral sense is that feeling which finds expression in duty or beneficent offices performed toward others, for aside from the relation of man with his fellow man, and the good will to perform such duties or beneficent offices as occasion may offer, moral obligations possess no force or value. The sense of moral duty cannot exist aside from such relation.

(2) Man cannot impose moral duties or moral obligations upon himself nor upon others which it would be intrinsically immoral to disregard.

(3) Neither domestic relations, nor society as known to civilized man, can exist without this sense of duty or moral obligation and the good will to perform them.

(4) There can be no moral obligation of any force or value without sanctions of some kind or other.

(5) Man cannot create tribunals qualified to take cognizance of motive and conduct intrinsically moral or immoral with power to enforce sanctions; nor can public opinion justly enforce moral sanctions, for the reason

that it has no means of ascertaining and correctly estimating motive.

(6) It therefore follows that moral obligations cannot be unerringly determined, nor sanctions unerringly adjusted in this life, and that this can only be done by some one having the requisite knowledge of motive and the power to enforce sanctions, and since no one in this life can possibly possess the requisite knowledge and power, it must be in another life or not at all; and without this it would be a matter of indifference so far as man's destiny is concerned, whether he lead a moral or an evil life.

The whole current of history shows that disregard of what the best of earth regard as moral duties have not, in the long run, been successful in social or national life, and that the uplift of the race has ever been associated with causes morally right.

"The wages of sin is death."

This does not require it to be believed that God is constantly interfering in, and proximately controlling, the affairs of mankind. The slow and inconstant effect of moral influences do not encourage that belief. On the contrary it shows that progressive moral development is in accordance with a reign of government by universal cosmic law conditioned, hindered, and delayed in individual life by varied environment and by the volition and intellectuality which makes man capable of development and a morally responsible being. It does show that the universal moral sense is gradually raising the moral level of man.

There must be an all prevading invincible purpose running through all the ages of man, which the moral sense serves in the life of the race and which in its enlightenment leads to correct judgments of what is intrinsically

right in morals or intrinsically wrong. How is this to be fairly inferred? And whence its source? Age upon age these queries are propounded. Age upon age natural reason has attempted the answer. Aside from purported special revelation, which not even a moiety of the most enlightened of the race admit to be of any value, can a satisfactory answer be rendered except upon the assumption of the moral sense as a natural, intuitive attribute of the soul personality. That much abused term conscience is an uncertain and misleading guide to moral conduct—quite as apt to go wrong as to go right. The term may be well enough when it stands for an enlightened sense of right and wrong; but in popular parlance it is so ambiguous in meaning, so various in its estimates of moral conduct; so much a matter of merely individual sentiment and feeling, often misplaced; so often a false or exaggerated estimate of the moral value of an unreflecting impulse, or emotional act, beneficial though it may be in result; so much a matter of environment, that the term is misleading and perhaps it would be better if it were altogether discarded from ethical literature, certainly as a test of essential morality—certainly as a safe guide to moral conduct. Even in ethical literature it is the subject of various definitions. Professor Hyslop in his *"Elements of Ethics,"* has a sub-title on the *"Current and other Meanings of the Term,"* under which he briefly summarizes the definitions of Bishop Butler, Dugald Stewart, Schopenhaur, Martineau and Dorner, no two exactly alike. He gives Dorner's definition thus: "Conscience is a knowledge of moral good and combines the functions of a cognitive, and a legislative, and a judicial power," This definition, or any one given, is well enough if it always meant the same thing in practical life. Or if it had not been made a pretext for some



of the greatest atrocities in history; or if to this day, it had not been found to mean intolerance and condemnation upon grounds not at all involving essential right or wrong.

The Apostle Paul, in his speech before Agrippa, said, "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth."

Rev. Dr. George Adam Smith, in his Yale lectures, quotes from a letter of the eminent and pure-minded Cardinal Newman, of the date of April 4, 1875, in which he refers to the Mosaic law concerning idolatry, blasphemy, and witchcraft, and St. Paul's transferring of the sword of the Christian magistrates, as authority for holding that the persecution of the Inquisition and the massacre of St. Bartholomew were not unjust, though not justifying the cruelty. It was, no doubt, the conscience of the Cardinal, trained in a particular direction which led him to apologize for what a conscience less influenced by Mosaic dogmatism regards as unspeakable atrocities.

A case of conscience involving greater atrocity because of greater enlightenment, was that of Jael, who, by unsurpassed treachery, induced Sisera to come into her tent under pretense of concealment from his enemies, and driving a tent-pin through his temples while he slept. For this act of treachery, the Song of Deborah and Barak, recorded in the book of Judges, represents the angel of Jehovah as calling Jael "blessed above women."

## XVI

## AND THE MORAL LAW—WHAT IT MEANS

It is here not out of place to insist that that form of civilization termed Christian civilization, widely as many think Christianity has departed from its original simplicity as set out in the New Testament, has proven to be a mighty instrumentality in developing the native intellectual and moral capacity of heathen tribes and in rectifying the moral judgment of many people who deem themselves civilized.

Whether or no Jesus was the incarnation of a Divine spirit, his mission was divine, and on any hypothesis of superior spiritual existences—and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul must include that probability—his coming was the advent of a character of spiritual elevation and incisive reforming force, unparalleled in the history of the race. And the era which has followed has been signalized by the greatest convulsions and revolutions, both moral and political, growing out of his advent, known to history.

At the time he came, the lofty conceptions had of Jehovah by the ancient Patriarchs, Prophets, and Psalmists, and the awful sense which prevailed of his presence and direction in the affairs of the Jewish people, had spent its force; and the Jewish religion had degenerated

into a mechanical formalism. Many, if not most, of his first disciples, being Jews, and retaining the Jewish notion of superiority to surrounding nations, believing Christ to be the Messiah who was to deliver them from the Roman yoke, and "restore again the kingdom to Israel," and perhaps establish himself on the throne of David, had in view more of national, and even personal advantage, than faith in the resurrection and a blessed future state of existence. Obligated to submit to the political dominance of tetrarchs and satraps of Roman appointment, they still retained their allegiance as a distinctive people or nationality to the rule in temple and synagogue of priests and elders, and found it difficult to break away from ceremonials to which all their lives they had been accustomed. They carried over much of this Judaism into the new religious societies. They even sought to impose the right of circumcision on the gentile disciples. And thus at an early period there grew up a body of priests and prelates under the Christian dispensation, arrogating to themselves sacerdotal privileges and functions. Ecclesiastical princes, purporting to wield celestial authority, declared dogmas and creeds, and denounced anathemas not found in the Gospels, nor in the Epistles of the Apostles, all drifting toward and ending in the sacerdotal thralldom of kings and peoples, and the terrors and horrors of faggot and sword for dissentients.

It is true that the worst features of theological, and political sacerdotalism have passed away. But with what remains, and the long and bitter sectarian dissensions and separations about forms, and ceremonials and dogmas which do not involve character, dating back to the days of Luther and Calvin, now being happily toned down, social and educational reforms, and moral progress have

been retarded. Nevertheless, while in the judgment of many competent observers, there is going on a gradual and widespread reaction in Europe and America, not only against dogma, but also against the sacred validity of the Bible and the supernatural divinity of Christ, and, as many believe, consequent loss of faith of a future life, the residual result is that, as a consequence of Jesus Christ having lived and left his plain and simple ministry to all ages, humanity has been raised to a higher moral plane with a more hopeful outlook for the future than in all the past. Certainly it cannot be questioned that the institution of the Christian system was an immense moral uplift out of what was left of the philosophical morality of aesthetic paganism and the effete formalism of Judaic theocracy which prevailed at the time of the advent of its founder. And it cannot be too much emphasized that it is to the hope of eternal life that is due the immense influence it has had in the affairs of the world, and will no doubt prolong it as a moral force in all the earthly career of man.

If then, it may reasonably be contended that the attribute of moral sense by which essential moral distinctions are, under favorable conditions, perceived and approved, is native and intuitive in all men, it is important to ascertain if the moral law is susceptible of being so summarily and categorically formulated as to be at once commended and approved by the moral sense of even those of a low state of intellectual development. Were it not possible to conceive, or to formulate such fundamental moral principle constituting a type or standard of moral values, there would be no criterion for guidance in the infinite details of the practical affairs of life calling for moral decision. Otherwise what is essentially morally right in any given instance would only

be a matter of individual opinion or conscience; and infinite moral confusion could not be avoided. In all the infinite and complex situations in which man is placed in his association with his fellowmen calling for discreet and right moral decision, were there no such typical principle as to what a man ought to do in a given moral situation, would be a matter to be decided from his own individual point of view, that variable and indefinite quality called conscience being his guide. As in criminal codes defining and fixing the punishment of murder it is not possible to set out in detail all the possible circumstances which may excuse or mitigate the offense, so it would not be possible for the practical moral judgment in the absence of a typical moral guide to act at once and correctly as to the moral value of many an act or motive.

The moral law is a social law. It is inconceivable except as a man owes duties to others. So far as we know it exists only for man. We know man as the only creature endowed with the capacity of possibly becoming altogether righteous or holy. We know him as a being unrighteous, unholy, sinful. The system of Christian ethics, so simple as hardly to be called a system, so unobscured by complex metaphysical definitions, so simply adapted to every degree of intelligence and condition of life, so marvelous in its potency to reform and build up character, that it seems destined to supplant all other systems, recognizes, with paramount emphasis, this characteristic social quality of the moral law. Christ in the parable of the good Samaritan enforces the universality of the obligation it imposes; and Paul also, as he stood "in the midst of Mars Hill," announced to the "men of Athens" that God had "made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of the earth." Duty to

ourselves, service to humanity, is its all pervading thought and requisite. The Great Teacher uttered the final summation of the Moral Law when he said, "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets." This is a fundamental, concrete, categorical, formulation of the moral law.

*This is the Moral Law.*

This categorical formulation of the moral law, commonly designated as the Golden Rule, has had universal recognition as the First Principle in morals, in all the most enlightened nations of antiquity and of the modern ages.

Haeckel in his "Riddle" thus writes of it: "The Golden Rule is five hundred years older than Christ; it was laid down as the highest moral principle by many Greek and oriental sages. Pittacus, of Mylene, one of the seven wise men of Greece, said six hundred and twenty years before Christ: 'Do not to thy neighbor that thou wouldst not suffer from him.' Confucius, the great Chinese philosopher and religious founder, (who rejected the idea of a personal God and the immortality of the soul) said five hundred years B. C.: 'Do to every man as thou wouldst have him do to thee; and do not to another what thou wouldst not have him do to thee; this precept only dost thou need; it is the foundation of all other commandments.' "

While Haeckel cites these historical facts for the purpose of discrediting Christ as an original and divinely inspired teacher, they are nevertheless of great value as tending to show that the cognition of this precept as a fundamental First Principle of morals is native to the human mind. The impertinent and irrelevant statement that Confucius did not believe in a personal God, nor in

the immortality of the soul, possesses no value whatever as against these beliefs. It only appears that he had no idea of the true source of the Moral Law.

Going further back still in his zeal to make a case against the preeminence of Christ as a moral teacher, Haeckel asserts ("Confession of Faith of a Man of Science") that the Golden Rule "had found place among the herds of Apes and other social Mammals . . . Brotherly love—mutual support, succor, protection, and the like—had already made its appearance among gregarious animals as a social duty." (Monism.) The term "duty" is generally understood as referring to what is required by the moral law, and "implies a fundamental conception of morals; a *conscious* performance of a moral obligation imposed from within." In such sense the word duty as used by Haeckel is absurd.

This First Principle is sufficiently comprehensive to indicate to individual man, as a member of organized society that, as Kant puts it, he "ought to act only in such a way as he could will that every one else should act under the same general conditions." The normal, universal moral judgment perceives that this is a maxim of morals which ought to universally prevail; that indeed it is so all-sufficient for every moral situation and emergency that could possibly arise out of the relations of man with man, or man to societies of men, that every attempt to catalogue the duties that man owes to man, or to organized society, would only limit its universality and value.

No elaboration of ethical theories could improve upon it, or extend its application. It is the concrete expression of the supreme good. While there is a vast lower moral and intellectual stratum of mankind so much enthralled with mythologies; so much engrossed

with material conditions; so much controlled by the instincts, impulses and appetites common to themselves and animals, that they do but little thinking, and have but imperfect notions of duty, it must be believed that the mind of universal man possesses the mental attribute to intuitively perceive the value and validity of this universal major maxim of morals when presented to it under favorable conditions.

The universal and perfect recognition of the duties imposed by the Golden Rule, and universal conformity to it in practical life, is, of course, an ideal condition. And generally, it may be said, that the difficulties to be encountered in making it a practical and universal rule of moral conduct would seem, on first thought, to be insurmountable. The idiosyncracies of temperament, the differences in intellectual capacity; the injurious and seemingly invincible influences of individual environment and heredity; mistakes of facts and errors of judgment upon facts, of the best intentioned people, the remedying of which conditions would seem to be impossible, do not now enable us to see that the ideal will ever become the real. Kant indeed maintained, that perfect conformity to the moral law is impossible in this life, and that, since the "categorical imperative"—which is Kant's formulation of the Golden Rule—invincibly demands moral perfection, a future state of existence is a necessity in order to attain the ideal. In his *Ethics* he says: "Now the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a *progress in infinitum* towards that perfect accordance, and on principles of pure practical reason, it is necessary



to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.

"Now this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an *endless* duration of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The *sumum bonum*, then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I mean a *theoretical* proposition, not demonstratable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an unconditional *a priori practical law*)."

"Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should *make* ourselves happy, but how we should make ourselves become *worthy* of happiness." Professor Sidgwick, in his "Methods of Ethics," says of Kant's maxim, "*Act from a principle or maxim that you can will to be a universal law*," that it threw the Golden Rule of the Gospel (Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you) into a form that commended itself to my reason . . . "Whatever is right for me must be right for all persons in similar circumstances."

The Golden Rule applies only in instances where fundamental principles of right and wrong are involved. It is common experience that men do unwise, indiscreet, impolitic things when their intentions are innocent, or at any rate not evil, when no principle of essential morals is involved, and to which it would be absurd or impertinent to apply the rule. And then its action cannot be invoked except when morally right that it should be. One confined in prison for crime cannot rightly ask that the officer having him in custody should discharge him

because he would like to be discharged in like situation. Mr. Huxley, in his "Evolution and Ethics," affords a typical instance of the misconception and abuse of interpretation of the Golden Rule; and it is a matter for surprise that so eminent and close a thinker should have put a construction upon it so out of joint with the context in which it appears, so foreign to the whole teaching of Christ and the whole tenor of the Gospels. Thus we read in the "Prolegomena": "Strictly observed, the 'Golden Rule' involves the negation of law by the refusal to put it in motion against law breakers; and, as regards the external relations of a polity, it is the refusal to continue the struggle for existence. It can be obeyed, even partially, only under the protection of a society which repudiates it. Without such shelter, the followers of the 'Golden Rule' may indulge in hopes of heaven, but they must reckon with the certainty that other people will be masters of the earth.

"What would become of the garden if the gardener treated all the weeds and slugs and birds and trespassers as he would like to be treated, if he were in their place?" His outre misconception of the spirit of the Golden Rule is forcibly illustrated in his attributing to weeds and slugs a consciousness of injustice in its literal application. Reading the Golden Rule between the lines we read: "Therefore all things whatsoever ye" (rightfully—morally—justly) "would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

Notwithstanding the prediction of Kant as to the ultimate moral outcome of this "sensible world," age compared with age since the dawn of history of the races which have been counted as civilized, or as the progenitors of the civilized, has shown a steady moral uplift, interrupted to be sure, by long periods of lapse and dark-

ness; and as enlightened man has reached the stage of intellectual and moral advancement when moral development and elevation are more than ever facilitated by the greater power to control environment and the evil tendencies of heredity, it seems reasonable to expect that in the long run of the ages, the ideal will become the real; when men will attain to that perfect moral state predicted by Mr. Spencer as the result of "accumulated experiences of utility" transmitted by heredity, when the "moral sentiments will guide just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations," though not as organic or physiological morality. It will be a conscious, thoughtful moral condition of universal society. A time when "on earth peace, and good will toward men," tidings of which the shepherds heard in the air, will universally prevail. Certainly no Christian believer is at liberty to profess doubt of this result.

The moral law must be—as to the inner life certainly can only be—enforced by the individual moral judgment. It is true, as was anciently said, that "every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." This drawing away, this enticing comes from social and material conditions with which man is related. From the point of view of the religion of the New Testament it is asserted, that the natural moral judgment is susceptible of being reinforced by the divine supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit. Be that as it may, the perception of the validity and value of the moral law must *a priori* obtain in the moral judgment. The apprehension of the moral law by the moral judgment goes before Christian faith and the supernatural reformation of the will.

Whence comes this intuitive sense of the righteousness of the moral law? Whence comes it that here is a moral

tribunal from whose judgments there is no appeal, and which has no executive but itself? Did it begin in the division of the primordial proto-plasmic cell, as Professor Drummond has said? Before the advent of man did it simply mean the attractiveness growing out of the differences in sex of animals, and the "altruism" growing out of the reproductive function? Did these biological processes constitute the tap-root out of which sprung the high moral sense of man? And then when the psycho-physical evolution was arrested in the highest animal next below man, leaving an abyss which anthropology has never been able to bridge over, how was the transmutation or mutation made? If not the result of the same evolutionary law which produced man's physical structure, as Mr. Wallace contends it was not; if there is nothing in fossil discoveries showing a gradual transition of skull formation and brain development of the animal to the skull formation and brain development of man, as Huxley is understood to contend that there is not; if in fact all the discoveries of science leave the abrupt disparity between the psychic of the highest animal and the psychic of the lowest man wholly unaccounted for by ages of slow and gradual accretion as most evolutionists hold, then it must be accounted for upon some other theory. But when we take into consideration that it is a change to the intellectual and the moral with the capacity of indefinitely increasing development, it would seem absurd to say, that the cause of the change was an unintelligent cause. If an intelligent cause, it must necessarily have been of a degree infinitely higher than the intelligence of the most highly developed man. It must have been the act of an Intelligence and Power so inconceivably higher than man that with reference to man it was Omniscient and Omni-

potent, in a word from God. It must have been the result of conscious, specific design. However difficult it may be to support this contention affirmatively, certainly it receives strong support in the impossibility that it should have been due to any other cause.

## XVII

## CHARITY—LOVE—GOOD WILL

While the moral law is a social law, neither political societies, nor human organizations, assuming vicarious divine functions and authority, can *a priori* so formulate it in detail as to enact it, or express it in creeds, and only in the more flagrant instances of violation, enforce it by penalties. Assuming the existence of God, it is inconceivable that He would not be perfect beyond human conception of perfection; and it cannot be commended to universal reason that a perfect, infallible being would delegate to imperfect, fallible, perishable creatures the authority, to say nothing of ability, to search out motive and by human penalties purge the sources of evil conduct. Temptations to do wrong come of social and material conditions and environments. The remedy must come from the individual moral judgment. Motive is the guiding, the controlling factor in the moral judgment. Kant in the opening sentence of his treatise on Ethics, forcibly says: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will." And the Greatest of the Apostles, he of Tarsus, the great Jewish metaphysician, put it still more forcibly when he wrote to the Corinthians in these burning words: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, (i.e. love, i.e. good will) I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.

"And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, (i. e., love, i. e., good will) I am nothing.

"And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity (i. e., love, i. e., good will), it profiteth me nothing.

. . . . .

"Charity never faileth; but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away."

This charity—this love—does not mean affection for the person, as commonly understood. It means love for the performance of duty; a benevolence springing out of a desire to help an unfortunate, or even an unworthy fellow creature; a mingling of pity and sorrow for one morally deformed; a longing to lift a fellowman out of the morass of moral depravity. As Kant truly says: "For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination—nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is *practical* love, and not *pathological*—a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense—in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.

. . . . .

"It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our neighbor, even our enemy."

Now the fact that man does possess that attribute of the mind which we call the moral sense, the moral judgment when the moral sense is in active exercise, which passes upon motives as well as conduct; the fact that man does have cognition of the intrinsically moral and the intrinsically immoral; the fact, for instance, that man does regard murder as evincing inherently a high degree of moral depravity, are matters of enormous significance in that by means of this moral sense we are able to distinguish between the intrinsically moral and the intrinsically immoral, at the same time admonishing us that the regarding or disregarding its behests may possibly affect our status in another life.



## XVIII

## THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

What is to be the future of science with reference to the prevalent religion of the most enlightened nations? And having exploded the theological dogmas largely due to Judaism, what will be the effect upon Christian faith if science shall also subvert belief in the miraculous which has so long been held to attest the divine origin of that system of faith? Would Christianity survive as a distinct religious system?

The most potent factors in its propagation and identification with the highest civilization are the transcendent personality of its founder and the strong reinforcement his religion has given to belief in the immortality of the soul—the strong assurance it has given that the morally fit will enjoy eternal life. No matter what shall become of the adventitious miraculous element, these pre-eminent factors will forever remain. Science certainly cannot do away with the fact of the perfect personality of Christ and his perpetually illuminating and inspiring example. Nor can it generally subvert faith in immortality. That faith lies outside the domain of science. When it comes to the moral and the spiritual its methods are inept. When it enters that field, it abandons the privileges and the authority of the expert, and is open to the criticism of those who, though not learned in science, may yet be more logical, and freer from the limitations imposed by mechanical and demonstrative methods. The

congenital moral sense cannot be eradicated out of the soul any more than the attribute of reason. It may be perverted as may any other mental attribute. The moral pre-eminence given to the Golden Rule by the perfect personality of Christ will be forever maintained. By that personality, it was made a distinguishing characteristic of his religion. All future generations will hear the gentle voice of the Christ proclaiming the Beatitudes from the Mount. All generations will feel a responsive sense of benevolence and affectionate approval on reading Paul's noble discourse on Charity—on brotherly good will—on universal good will. There will be those in every generation who will thrill with exultation—with exultation—on reading the triumphant words of the Greatest of the Apostles: "So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in Victory.

"O death where is thy sting? O grave where is thy victory?"

And so multitudes in every generation will have place in their souls for the love of the inspired Nazarene, and will be solaced and cheered by the hope of eternal life.

Here is embodied a religion which satisfies reason, and contains the solace that when the righteous shall lay down this corruption they will put on incorruption; a religion, the universal prevalence of which among the nations of the earth, would mean the decay of all the navies of the world at their docks, and the disarmament of all the armies. It would mean that nations would not "learn war any more." It would empty prisons. It would mean the abolition of the slums of the great cities, reeking with filth and pauperism, and beastliness and crime, while in a nearby street the Christless rich are

wallowing and sweltering in luxuries they cannot consume, and maybe only leave to idle and worthless progeny. It would mean the kindly, considerate, brotherhood of employer and employee. It would mean that enlightened mankind would co-operate in lifting up all the barbarous and heathen peoples to the high level of universal and benevolent brotherhood.

In that era, if it is to come, for which all good people hope and pray, of universal peace and "good will toward men," man will have the abiding consciousness that the "Categorical Imperative"—that is to say the Moral Law, concretely formulated in the Golden Rule—is a Revelation of God and Everlasting Life.

"It must be so,—Plato, thou reasonest well!—  
 Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,  
 This longing after immortality?  
 Or whence this secret dread, and inward horror,  
 Of falling into naught? Why shrinks the soul  
 Back on herself? and startles at destruction?  
 'T is the divinity that stirs within us;  
 'Tis heaven itself that points out an hereafter,  
 And intimates eternity to man."  
 —Addison's tragedy of *Cato*.

*FINIS*









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